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Abstract 
Offshore vessels represent one of the most dangerous working environments in the 
Norwegian offshore industry (e.g. Dahl, Fenstad, & Kongsvik, 2014). In the present study, we 
have adopted a proactive safety approach using the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 
1998), as the theoretical framework, in which we identify factors that reduce safety, to 
encourage mitigation of their adverse effects. Our study aims to contribute with a positive 
approach to maintain safety. We investigate the effects of positive individual characteristics 
(psychological capital, safety climate, job satisfaction) and cognitive factors (situation 
awareness and risk perception) on proximal safety outcomes (reporting attitudes and risk 
behavior) in a safety-critical organization. Using a single wave survey design, 127 employees 
on board offshore vessels responded to our pre-registered survey. To summarize our results, a 
multiple linear regression confirms a positive prediction of psychological capital and safety 
climate on situation awareness (H1), supporting the broaden-and-build effects of positive 
affect, however, job satisfaction was a non-significant predictor, violating our hypothesized 
assumption. Secondly, a simple linear regression confirmed a positive relationship between 
situation awareness and risk behavior (H2). Finally, a mediation analysis revealed that the 
positive relationship between safety climate and reporting attitudes is partially mediated 
through job satisfaction (H3). Exploratory regression analyses showed small relationships of 
situation awareness and risk perception; as well as risk perception and risk behavior. The 
results suggest that to improve safety, shipping companies should invest in proactive 
interventions for their crew, which may increase cognitive adaptability, extended knowledge 
capacities and social cohesiveness. 
Keywords: situation awareness, psychological capital, safety climate, safety-critical 
organizations, broaden-and-build theory 
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Sammendrag  
Offshore-skip representerer et av farligste arbeidsmiljøene i den norske offshore-
industrien (e.g. Dahl, Fenstad, & Kongsvik, 2014).. I dette studiet har vi benyttet en proaktiv 
sikkerhetstilnærming ved å benytte broaden-and-teorien (Fredrickson, 1998) som vårt 
teoretiske rammeverk, hvorpå vi identifiserer faktorer som reduserer sikkerhet, for å 
promotere skadebegrensning av deres påvirkning. Studiets mål er å bidra med en positiv 
tilnærming til sikkerhetsbevaring. Vi undersøker effektene av positive individuelle 
karakteristikker (psykologisk kapital, sikkerhetsklima, jobbtilfredshet) og kognitive faktorer 
(situasjonsbevissthet og risikopersepsjon) på tilnærmede sikkerhetsutfall 
(rapporteringsholdninger og risikoatferd) i en sikkerhetskritisk organisasjon. Ved bruk av 
enkeltbølgesundersøkelsesdesign, svarte 127 ansatte om bord offshore-skip på vår pre-
registrerte studie. For å oppsummere resultatene, ble et predikerende positivt forhold av 
psykologisk kapital og sikkerhetsklima opp mot situasjonsbevissthet, som støttet effektene av 
broaden-and-build-teorien av positiv affekt gjennom en multippel lineær regresjonsanalyse 
(H1). Jobbtilfredshet derimot, var ikke en signifikant predikator av situasjonsbevissthet i 
motsetning til våre forventinger. Videre bekreftet en enkel lineær regresjonsanalyse et positivt 
forhold mellom situasjonsbevissthet og risikoatferd (H2). Til sist avslørte en 
mediasjonsanalyse at det positive forholdet mellom sikkerhetsklima og 
rapporteringsholdninger er delvis mediert av jobbtilfredshet (H3). Eksplorerende 
regresjonsanalyser viste svake assosiasjoner mellom situasjonsbevissthet og risikopersepsjon; 
og mellom risikopersepsjon og risikoatferd. Resultatene våre peker mot at for å forbedre 
sikkerheten, så burde rederier investere i proaktive intervensjoner for deres ansatte, som vil 
kunne føre til økt kognitiv fleksibilitet, forbedret kunnskap og sosial samhørighet. 
Nøkkelord: situasjonsbevissthet, psykologisk kapital, sikkerhetsklima, sikkerhetskritiske 
organisasjoner, broaden-and-build-teorien 
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Prosper at Sea: A Proactive Approaches to Safety 
In 2012, the Norwegian fleet was comprised of 557 offshore vessels, making the 
offshore sector one of the largest growth areas in the shipping industry (Norwegian 
Shipowners Association; NSA, 2014). In recent years, there has been a significant 
globalization of offshore markets, in which half of operating revenues are derived from 
outside the Norwegian continental shelf, in regions such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa 
(NSA, 2014). Considering the growth of the offshore industry, the role of safety management 
and identifying the factors essential for maintaining safety is increasingly important.  
Several researchers have argued that the offshore vessels represent one of the most 
dangerous working environments in the offshore sector in Norway (Dahl, Fenstad, & 
Kongsvik, 2014; Kongsvik, Fenstad, & Wendelborg, 2012). According to the Norwegian 
Maritime Directorate (2011), around 750 injuries and 12 fatalities on offshore vessels were 
reported between the 2000 to 2010. During this period, several high casualty accidents 
occurred. For instance, in 2000, a collision involving Nordfrakt caused six fatalities, and the 
sinking of Steinfalk caused three fatalities. In 2003, the capsizing of Kongsting caused four 
deaths, and the capsizing of Rocknes in 2004 caused eighteen deaths. Lastly, the capsizing of 
the anchor handling vessel, Bourbon Dolphin, caused eight fatalities in 2007 (Norwegian 
Maritime Directorate, 2011). Although the frequency of accidents and fatalities in Norway are 
decreasing (Norwegian Maritime Authority, 2018), it nevertheless remains important to 
develop applicable knowledge of safety factors in the offshore industry, and to investigate 
significant causal factors to prevent future accidents.  
Three main types of offshore vessels are included in this study: Platform Supply 
Vessel, Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessels, and Construction Support Vessels. These 
vessels serve different functions: for instance, Platform Supply Vessels mainly transport oil 
field products and supplies to offshore drilling and production installations. The majority of 
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their cargos consist of fuel, drilling mud, cement, water, and chemicals for drilling operations 
(Dahl, Fenstad, & Kongsvik, 2014; Norwegian Shipowners Association, 2014). Anchor 
Handling Tug Supply vessels are used to set anchors for drilling rigs and towing mobile rigs 
and equipment from one location to another. They are equipped with winches and machinery 
tailored to anchor handling operations (Dahl et al., 2014; Norwegian Shipowners Association, 
2014). Lastly, Construction Support Vessels are comprised of several different vessels 
designed for underwater operations and construction work, such as diving vessels, well 
stimulation vessels, pipelaying vessels, construction support vessels, and multipurpose 
support vessels. These vessels often work with field development for operations and 
production, as well as installing and repairing subsea installations (Norwegian Shipowners 
Association, 2014).  
The primary tasks for employees on offshore vessels include lifting operations of large 
containers, handling bulk loading hoses under tough conditions, operating high-tension cranes 
and wires, navigating vessel locations, supporting and maintaining the vessels’ machines, and 
rescuing personnel after vessel evacuation (Dahl, Fenstad, & Kongsvik, 2014). Ideally, 
employees in safety-critical organizations such as the offshore industry should be vigilant in 
their working environment to maintain safety (Valdersnes, Eid, Hystad, & Nilsen, 2017). As 
an offshore employee, it is important to have control over every situation and stay alert during 
all operations, as they are working in hazardous and challenging environments, and dealing 
with complex technology (Dahl et al., 2014). However, employees in offshore vessels work in 
tough conditions with long hours and solitary shifts. Working onboard for several weeks at a 
time, employees live at their workplace, with limited contact with people outside of their 
working environment. Employees report experiencing long shifts, boredom, fatigue, lack of 
motivation, high stress levels, feeling restrained by enclosed work facilities, and feeling as if 
they are never off work, even when their shift is over (e.g. Ulleberg & Rundmo, 1997; 
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Valdersnes et al., 2017). Such factors influence employees’ mental and physical health, 
motivation, and their working performance abilities, thus increasing the risk of accidents.  
Accidents as Human Error  
Human error may be understood as injuries and events caused by limitations in human 
information processing systems, resulting in a mismatch between individual behavior and the 
demands of the system (Rundmo, 2018). Initially, Reason (2000) demonstrated two ways of 
viewing human error: the person approach and the system approach. The person approach 
emphasizes that deviating mental processes, such as inattention, forgetfulness, poor 
motivation, carelessness, recklessness, and negligence, are the primary cause of unsafe 
actions. In contrast, the system approach is based on the idea that humans are fallible, and 
errors are expected to occur in any organization (Reason, 2000). Furthermore, the system 
approach emphasizes the view that errors are consequences of recurrent error traps in the 
workplace. According to this approach, when system defenses fail, inquiries should concern 
how and why they failed, rather than who is to blame. In other words, the person approach 
distinguishes error as a moral issue in which someone is responsible for the event, while the 
system approach focuses on the dynamic nature of the conditions in which humans operate, 
rather than individual accountability (Reason, 2000). In accordance with the system approach, 
Dekker (2001) suggested that improvements to safety originate from an understanding of how 
system defenses are connected, as safety is not an inherent quality of any system but created 
by people at all levels of an operational organization. A central characteristic of this new view 
of human error is that systems themselves essentially are contradictions between multiple 
goals that are attended at the same time (Dekker, 2001). Further, Dekker emphasized the 
importance of acknowledging that individuals’ behavior is rational when they find themselves 
in a certain situation, although it may be deemed erroneous when analyzed in hindsight and 
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outside of the situation. By understanding human error as a result of weaknesses in the 
systems’ defense layers, we can better investigate why an accident occurred to get a better 
understanding of how to develop safety in the organization.  
Unexpected versus Unforeseen Accidents  
Safety-critical situations and accidents are defined as the negative consequences of 
unexpected and unforeseen events (Rundmo, 2018). Unexpected events are similar to 
previous accidents, and the information we gain from the event can be used to foresee the 
severity and causal factors for future events. Operators in safety-critical situations often use 
their knowledge and experience from previous accidents to understand, predict, and prevent 
future events (Rundmo, 2018). However, it can be hard to predict when incidents may occur, 
as accidents occur infrequently. Unforeseen events, on the other hand, are unpredicted events 
that have not previously occurred, and can be seen as a side effect of an organization's 
operational planning (Rundmo, 2018). It may be difficult to predict the specific 
characteristics, causal factors and the severity of unforeseen events, and it is hard to foresee 
the probability of occurrence due to a lack of experiences from similar negative outcomes and 
events (Rundmo, 2018). Human errors, unforeseen and unexpected events, and active and 
latent failures tell us something about what characterizes an accident and why they occur.  
Safety Barriers and The Swiss Cheese Model 
Organizations have many defensive layers whose function is to protect from hazards. 
Reason (1990) illustrated the potential threats to safety through the Swiss cheese model, 
consisting of several layers (i.e. safety barriers) in which the holes (i.e failed defenses), as 
they are continually opening, shutting, and relocating, represent possible threats to the safety 
layers in the organization. When holes of the cheese layers align, they allow a straight 
trajectory to form, making accidents and hazards more likely to occur (Reason, 2000). The 
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holes emerge as a result of active failures (e.g. unsafe actions, such as slips, fumbles, 
mistakes, and procedural violations conducted by employees) and latent failures (i.e. dormant 
conditions created by designers and management; Reason, 2000). The latent failures can lie 
dormant for long periods of time, until they at one point affect the system negatively, by 
either having an error-provoking effect on the workplace (e.g. time pressure, operator fatigue, 
operators’ inexperience, inadequate equipment) or causing long-lasting weaknesses in the 
systems (e.g. untrustworthy alarms, unworkable procedures, and design and construction 
deficiencies; Reason, 2000). Due to the unpredictable nature of active failures, they will be 
hard to foresee, while latent conditions are easier to identify and predict. Consequently, 
understanding and resolving latent conditions is essential for a proactive approach to 
maintaining safety, and the Swiss cheese model is a helpful tool to achieve an understanding 
of when accidents could occur (Reason, 2000). Moreover, with the assumption that active 
failures are linked to errors of individual factors (e.g. situation awareness, decision-making, 
risk perception, and risk behavior), investigating this relationship may give us valuable 
information about why accidents caused by active failures occur, and how to reduce their 
prevalence. In the offshore industry it is essential to maintain safety barriers to prevent 
accidents (Bergheim, Nielsen, Mearns, & Eid, 2015). 
Safety-Critical Organizations 
Safety-critical organizations involve work settings that are prone to accidents, injuries, 
stress, and other harmful health outcomes (Hystad, Bartone, & Eid, 2014). The offshore 
industry is identified as incorporating many safety-critical organizations, in which employees 
operate in hazardous settings that require intensive use of technology, stressful working 
environments, complex operations, and high professional knowledge, while concurrently 
being vulnerable to human and organizational errors and challenges (Tharaldsen, Olsen, & 
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Rundmo, 2008; Hystad et al., 2014). Notably, both offshore installations and vessels are 
located far out to sea, limiting the accessibility of fire rescue and medical aid, which may 
cause additional stress to hazardous situations (Høivik, Tharaldsen, Baste, & Moen, 2009). 
One of the hazardous risks related to the working conditions at offshore installations is the 
involvement of flammable substances in the production, which can result in fires and 
explosions (Høivik et al., 2009). Safety-critical organizations need to be better prepared than 
other organizations for accidents, which is why it is important to investigate which factors 
compose possible threats to the safety barriers in an organization. Due to the high potential of 
risks connected to safety-critical organizations, many organizations have focused on accident 
prevention by facilitating resources towards the improvement of employee safety at the 
workplace (Hystad et al. 2014), such as implementing safety protocols and procedures 
(Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 2011) as well as training of personnel (Tharaldsen et al., 
2008). 
Psychological Capital 
 Psychological capital (PsyCap) emerged in the field of positive organizational 
behavior, as a construct indicating positive work motivation in an organization (Hystad, 
Bartone & Eid, 2014; Bergheim, Nielsen, Mearns, & Eid, 2015). PsyCap consists of positive 
characteristics that are recognized as resources of an organizational motivation that reinforce 
safety-focused behavior in safety-critical organizations, such as the offshore industry (Eid, 
Mearns, Larsson, Laberg, & Johnsen, 2012). Employees with high levels of PsyCap can use 
these positive resources as a toolbox when faced with challenges. PsyCap consists of four 
personality dimensions: hope, self-efficacy, resilience, and optimism (abbreviated HERO; e.g. 
Eid et al. 2012, Hystad et al., 2014).  
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According to Snyder, Irving, and Anderson (1991) hope consists of two components: a 
tendency to invest energy into goal-directed behavior (i.e. agency) and envision pathways to 
succeed. Individuals with high levels of hope, in comparison to those with low levels, employ 
a more goal-oriented motivation and behavior to succeed at a specific task in a given context 
to reach their goals. Further, they have a greater capacity to develop alternative pathways to 
reach their goals when faced with obstacles (Snyder et al., 1991; Avey, Wernsing, & Luthans, 
2008; Eid, Mearns, Larsson, Laberg, & Johnsen, 2012; Newman, Ucbasaran, Zhu, & Hirst, 
2014). Likewise, employees with more hope address a task or challenge that encourages the 
motivation needed to achieve success (Avey et al., 2008). 
Self- efficacy is based on Bandura’s social cognitive theory (e.g Avey, Wernsing, & 
Luthans, 2008; Newman, Ucbasaran, Zhu, & Hirst, 2014), and can be defined as “The 
employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to mobilize the motivation, 
cognitive resources, or courses of action needed to successfully execute a specific task within 
a given context” (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998, p. 66). Individuals with high levels of self-
efficacy have more confidence in their ability to control the outcomes in a safety-critical 
situation, and to succeed in the difficult challenges they encounter (Newman et al., 2014; Eid, 
Mearns, Larsson, Laberg, & Johnsen, 2012). Furthermore, to enhance employee's self-
efficacy, the focus should be placed on mastering tasks, role modeling, and increasing social 
support (Avey et al., 2008).  
Resilience is defined as “the positive psychological capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce 
back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive change, progress and 
increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002 p. 702). Although resilience resembles other positive 
constructs (e.g. hardiness, self-efficacy, and hope), there are some notable differences. For 
instance, self-efficacy is considered proactive, while resilience on the other hand can be 
considered reactive. Resilience can be similar to the pathways of hope, but it does not contain 
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the dimensions of hope (Luthans, 2002). Highly resilient employees have a strong ability to 
positively adapt and thrive in challenging situations (Avey, Wernsing, & Luthans, 2008). 
Hystad, Bartone, and Eid (2014) suggested that resilient employees contribute to increasing 
positive safety-focused attitudes and behaviors, through their commitment and motivation for 
positive work outcomes, despite conflicts and temptations to be time-efficient at the expense 
of safety procedures. 
Lastly, optimism refers to the tendency to think positively about the future, and the 
ability to recognize the value of change to improve safety in certain situations (Eid, Mearns, 
Larsson, Laberg, & Johnsen, 2012; Hystad, Bartone, & Eid, 2014). Optimistic individuals 
make individual attributions of positive expectancies of achieving success, even when faced 
with challenges, or in processes of organizational change (Avey, Wernsing, & Luthans, 2008; 
Newman, Ucbasaran, Zhu, & Hirst, 2014). These positive expectancies work as motivators 
when pursuing goals and resolving safety-critical situations (Seligman, 1998; Newman et al., 
2014). Furthermore, the conceptual framework of optimism is based on the theory that 
individuals experiencing positive outcomes and success are likely to make internal 
attributions, while negative outcomes and failures are likely to be explained by external and 
unstable attributions (Seligman, 1998; Avey et al., 2008). Based on this notion, optimistic 
employees experiencing a failure might remain motivated to succeed, as the failure is not 
attributed to their ability, but rather to a specific challenge that is unlikely to occur again 
(Avey et al., 2008).  
The positive resources that form PsyCap are considered more stable than emotions, 
but less fixed than personality traits (Luthans, Avey, Avolio, & Peterson, 2010; Bergheim, 
Nielsen, Mearns, & Eid, 2015). Thus, the four constructs that constitute PsyCap are 
considered to be relatively stable, yet open for development (Luthans, Avolio, Avey, & 
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Norman, 2007), which indicate that the features can be improved by training (Newman, 
Ucbasaran, Zhu, & Hirst, 2014; Bergheim, Nielsen, Mearns, & Eid, 2015).  
Schaubroeck, Riolli, Peng, and Spain (2011) conducted a cross-sectional survey of US 
armed forces personnel who had been exposed to traumatic events. They found that PsyCap 
was able to predict health outcomes (anxiety, phobic anxiety, somatization, and depression), 
and appraisal of stress (challenge, threat, and loss) in the soldiers 15 months after traumatic 
exposure. For instance, individuals in the same military unit with higher levels of PsyCap 
reported lower levels of threat and loss, and higher levels of challenge. Their findings suggest 
that although individuals with higher PsyCap will experience feelings of threat and loss, 
however, their perceptions of how stressful the situation is, will differ. Furthermore, they 
found that PsyCap was positively related to positive affect, which the authors propose may be 
a partial indication of the broaden-and-build tendency of positive emotionality as resilience 
traits (Schaubroeck, Riolli, Peng, & Spain, 2011). 
 
The relationship between psychological captial and safety. Previous research has 
found that the motivational states of PsyCap are related to organizational effectiveness and 
desired work outcomes (Newman, Ucbasaran, Zhu, & Hirst, 2014), as well as job 
performance and satisfaction (Luthans, Avolio, Avey, & Norman, 2007). These factors may 
feasibly contribute to maintaining safety at the workplace.  
As previously mentioned, Avey, Wernsing, and Luthans (2008) found that the 
employees’ positive resources (PsyCap and positive emotions) can reduce the negative 
reactions associated with the impairment of organizational change, such as cynicism and 
deviance. Additionally, the results indicate that the employee’s positive resources are 
associated with positive attitudes and behavior (i.e. emotional engagement and organizational 
citizenship), indicating that individuals with higher levels of PsyCap may facilitate a 
PROSPER AT SEA: A PROACTIVE APPROACH TO SAFETY    18  
proactive approach for positive organizational change, which is critical for employees 
acceptance and commitment for effective improvements of organizational systems (Avey et 
al., 2008). Based on this short review, individuals with higher PsyCap play an integral part in 
fostering positive employee motivation, as well as facilitating employees’ positive resources, 
which can reduce adverse outcomes of safety-critical situations (e.g. limiting risk behavior), 
as well as strengthening the employees’ positive reactions (i.e. promoting a positive safety 
climate and improving reporting attitudes). Furthermore, as employees with higher PsyCap 
experience more positive affect, we can expect that they utilize a wider array of thought-
behavior repertoires, which in turn may result in additional positive attitudes and behavior. 
Arguably, individuals with higher PsyCap may be better at handling changes in their work 
environment concerning working conditions or organizational safety regulations by being 
more motivated and open for change. Moreover, by utilizing positive resources, the 
employees might be better at acknowledging the value of organizational change to increase 
safety, as well as being more encouraged to comply with the safety regulations of their work 
environment.  
Safety Climate  
Organizational climate involves employees’ evaluations and shared perceptions of 
selected features of their work environment, such as policies that define strategic goals, 
procedures that provide guidelines to achieve specified goals, and practices that relate to the 
enactment of policies and procedures (Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 2010). Moreover, an organization 
has many goals, procedures, and practices, which form multiple domain-specific climates, 
such as safety climate (Zohar, 2000). Organizational climate has been found to impact 
individual work motivation, effort, and performance, indicating that employees who view 
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their work environment as safe will be more involved, committed, and motivated to perform 
well in their work (Brown & Leigh, 1996).  
A related construct is safety culture, which is considered a complex and stable 
phenomenon that reflects on individual values, norms, assumptions and expectations 
concerning safety that are shared by the team (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998). 
Safety climate, on the other hand, is used to describe individuals’ perceptions, attitudes and 
beliefs about the risks and safety in an environment (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Employees’ 
perception of the management’s commitment to safety and safety priorities is based on the 
enactment of the existing procedures and regulations (Zohar, 2000). Consequently, it has been 
argued that the main difference between safety culture and safety climate is that safety culture 
entails how individuals behave within an organization, whilst safety climate reflects on how it 
feels to be a member in an organization (Mearns et al., 1998).  
Notably, it is argued that safety culture should be assessed with the use of qualitative 
methods, such as interviews, observations and fieldwork, whilst safety climate is usually 
measured in the form of questionnaires (Tharaldsen, Olsen, & Rundmo, 2008). Measuring 
safety climate through this form of research provides a “snapshot” of the current state of the 
safety culture in the organization (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; Mearns & Flin, 
1999; Tharaldsen et al., 2008).  
Safety climate is a resource that makes the employees feel safer by reducing the 
negative effects of their work environment through its capacity to motivate safe behavior, thus 
making the workplace more stable and controllable (Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 
2011). Correspondingly, lower levels of safety climate contribute to an unstable work 
situation, thus making the employees feel less safe due to the greater risk of a hazardous 
incident occurring (Nielsen et al., 2011).  
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Neal, Griffin, and Heart (2000) found that knowledge and motivation mediated the 
relationship between safety climate and safety performance, meaning that an improvement of 
employees’ knowledge and safety motivation can strengthen the relationship between safety 
climate and performance. Understanding the shared perceptions of safety-related issues across 
workgroups and organizations can offer cues of expected behavior and outcomes related to 
safety (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). Previous research has shown that safety climate 
influences safety motivation, risk behavior, and safety outcomes (e.g. Griffin & Curcuruto, 
2016). Similarly, Jiang, Lavaysse, and Probst (2018) also demonstrated the well-established 
positive relationship between safety climate and safety behavior, as well as a negative 
relationship between safety climate and risk perception, and accident frequency. Hystad, 
Bartone, and Eid (2014) conducted a study in which the importance of leadership’s influence 
on safety climate was highlighted. They observed that those who worked in teams with 
authentic leaders tended to assimilate their leaders’ emotions, attitudes, and motivation 
towards executing safety-focused behavior. 
 
Job satisfaction and safety climate. Job satisfaction is defined as an affective or 
emotional reaction to how employees feel or the attitudes they hold about their current job 
tasks and work environment (Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 2011). Previous studies 
have demonstrated that tough working conditions are negatively related to job satisfaction, for 
instance, employees who experience more workplace stressors tend to be less satisfied with 
their job (Sullivan & Bhagat, 1992). Equally, such tendencies have been found in safety-
critical organizations. For instance, findings reveal that offshore personnel who encounter 
more job-related stress are less satisfied with their job (Ulleberg and Rundmo, 1997). 
Also, employees with high levels of safety climate tend to be more satisfied with their 
job (Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 2011). Employee satisfaction is related to the degree 
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an organization prioritizes the security needs in the workplace (i.e. safety climate). For 
instance, if there are inconsistencies between the organization and employees’ perception of 
safety and the organization fails to meet the needs of the employees, it may result in less 
favorable attitudes and lower job satisfaction (Morrow & Crum, 1998).  
Risk Perception 
Risk perception refers to an individual’s perception of the likelihood of the occurrence 
of a specific hazardous event, as well as how concerned they are with the outcomes of such an 
event (Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 2011). In 2017, the Norwegian Maritime 
Authority found that six out of 25 hazardous accidents on vessels were considered high-risk 
events, such as collisions, grounding, capsizing, fire, falls overboard, and crush and impact 
injuries. Accordingly, to get an accurate understanding of employees' risk perception, it is 
essential to measure the perceived likelihood of an event by portraying scenarios that are 
likely to occur in their job environment. Risks and dangers in the offshore industry are 
composed of a combination of hazardous situations that can be shared with other safety-
critical organizations and, as those specific to the maritime industry (Nielsen et al., 2011). 
Although extremely hazardous situations are rare, they are still considered a consistent threat 
to safety (Nielsen et al., 2011). Examples of possible risks and dangers involve threats to the 
structural installation, fires, explosions, blowouts, accidents associated with the transport of 
personnel and supplies, dangers associated with drilling operations, diving accidents, and falls 
(Rundmo, 1996b, Nielsen et al., 2011).  
Rundmo (1996b) conducted a study in which employees in the offshore industry were 
asked to rate their risk perceptions concerning “regular occupational incidents” (e.g. falling 
objects or crushing by machinery) and major accidents (e.g. fires, explosions, and blowouts). 
Results showed that 64 % of the employees felt safe concerning regular occupational 
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incidents. Moreover, with respect to major accidents and disasters, 66 % of the employees 
reported feeling safe. 
Mearns, Rundmo, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (2004) compared risk perceptions across 
two groups with different nationalities, namely Norwegian and British offshore workers. 
Their findings suggested that risk perception is more influenced by safety climate and their 
experiences, than culture and location. Although being exposed to the same working 
environment, the employees demonstrated differing evaluations of organizational and 
psychosocial conditions.  
 
Risk perception and safety. Tharaldsen, Olsen, and Rundmo (2008) found a negative 
relationship between the overall scores of risk perception and safety climate, suggesting that 
employees with higher perceived risks have more negative perceptions of safety climate. 
More specifically, the sub-dimensions of safety climate that showed a negative correlation 
with risk perception were system comprehension, safety management and involvement. 
Moreover, they found a positive relationship between risk perception and accident rates: when 
accident rates are high, the employees also view the potential risk of accidents as high 
(Tharaldsen et al., 2008). Correspondingly, the negative relationship between risk perception 
and safety climate was also supported by Hystad, Bartone, and Eid (2014) indicating that the 
employees who recognize the safety climate as positive will perceive the likelihood of 
accidents occurring as lower. Their findings suggest that more accidents occur when the 
employees perceive safety climate as negative.  
Further, Rundmo (1995) found that employees at offshore installations who had 
previously been injured, as well as employees with higher accident records tended to feel less 
safe, had fewer positive perceptions of safety climate, and experienced more job stress than 
they did before the accident. Similarly, another study demonstrated that those who had 
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experienced a near-miss reported having higher levels of risk perception, as well as lower 
safety climate and job satisfaction (Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 2011). Interestingly, 
this trend was not found among those who had experienced accidents. Moreover, Rundmo 
(1996a) suggested that having inaccurately biased perceptions of risk (i.e. having a risk 
perception that does not correspond to the actual threats of the environment) could cause 
miscalculations of potential hazardous situations, which could result in unfortunate risk 
behavior, actions, and decisions.  
Furthermore, Mearns and Flin (1995) reported that the perceived risks and 
organization stressors contributed to accidents and injuries among offshore employees. 
Moreover, the results showed that job satisfaction, safety attitudes, and safety climate affected 
the employees’ risk perception. Moreover, Mearns and Flin (1995) theorized the socio-
cognitive model of risk perception (displayed in Figure 1), in which both social and cognitive 
factors contribute to risk behavior and accidents in the workplace. At the basic perceptual 
level, it is important to get a comprehensive picture of the critical situation by identifying the 
hazard and gathering information from the situation. Knowledge of possible risks and 
consequences, experiences of how to deal with and cope with the hazard, and the frequency of 
previous accidents help to form the individual’s assessment of the critical situation. A 
combination of the risk assessment, job satisfaction, and safety climate is likely to determine 
the attitude to the risk. Later, the risk attitudes will then determine the possible course of 
action, for instance, an accident is likely to occur if the operator executes unsafe acts, 
mistakes, and violations of the safety protocols. Contrastingly, by acting carefully and making 
safety-focused choices one can avoid the accident (Mearns & Flin, 1995). Therefore, the 
socio-cognitive model of risk perception illustrates how both cognitive factors (e.g. situation 
awareness and risk perception) and social factors (e.g. safety climate, job satisfaction, risk 
behavior) are important for safety outcomes. 
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Figure 1. The socio-cognitive model of risk perception in hazardous work 
environments. The figure displays how socio-cognitive factors influence the risk perception 
process from hazard perception to accident. Socio-cognitive factors affect the risk perception 
process, displayed by the arrows pointing towards the levels of risk perception which they 
affect. Retrieved from “Risk Perception and Attitudes to Safety by Personnel in the Offshore 
Oil and Gas Industry: a Review” by K. Mearns and R. Flin, 1995, Journal of loss prevention in 
the process industries, 8, p. 300. Copyright 1995 by Elsevier Science Ltd. 
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Risk Behavior 
In the present study, we have decided to use the term risk behavior to describe the 
tendency to perform unsafe actions to complete work tasks quickly. Specifically, risk 
behavior entails the act of ignoring safety regulations, engaging in prohibited actions, 
incorrect work-task execution, and sloppy use of protective equipment (Rundmo, 1996a). We 
argue that the term risk behavior accurately labels the intention and conceptualization of 
performing unsafe behavior. The conceptualization of risk behavior arguably has 
shortcomings in that researchers use different terminology to describe similar concepts (Neal 
& Griffin, 2004). Some researchers have used terminology with a positive approach, such as 
safety behavior (Neal & Griffin, 2004; Hjellvik, Aga, & Sætrevik, in press) or safety 
performance behavior (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009), which is focusing on 
behavior that may contribute to safety (Neal & Griffin, 2004). Meanwhile, terminology with 
an negative approach is being applied by others, for instance, risk behavior (Rundmo, 1996a), 
unsafe actions (Sætrevik & Hystad, 2017), and risk-taking behavior (Sandhåland, 2017), 
which focus on the likelihood of participating in behavior that prevents safety at the 
workplace. Although the concepts are generally the same, the variety of terminology and 
measures being used to explain the same phenomenon complicates the ability to track the 
scientific development in this area of safety science.  
Risk behavior is fairly common: Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (1998) found that 
nearly half of the participants in their study admitted that they seldom or sometimes partook 
in risk behavior, involving shortcuts, bending the rules, and feeling that the job was carried 
out better by ignoring some rules. Furthermore, Rundmo (1996a) demonstrated that 
employees who feel less safe will be more likely to participate in risky behavior. Additionally, 
employees ignoring safety rules and regulations, and carrying out forbidden activities 
predicted objective risk in the workplace (Rundmo, 1996a). It is important to notice that this 
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relationship between risk perception and risk behavior does not entail causality. The 
relationship between risk behavior and risk perception is complex: while some researchers 
have assumed that risk behavior is the result of poor perception of risk (Rundmo, Tharaldsen, 
& Olsen, 2007), others have found that employees who participate in risk behavior have an 
accurate perception of risk (Flin, Mearns, O´Connor, & Bryden, 2000). 
In regard to safety attitudes, Mearns, Rundmo, Flin, Gordon, Fleming, and Mark, 
(2004) found that employees from the United Kingdom were more in agreement than 
Norwegian employees of feeling pressured to put production before safety, and they also 
tended to agree with statements of having control over their own safety behavior. Norwegian 
employees, on the other hand, tended to have more fatalistic attitudes towards accidents than 
British employees, indicating that the employees believe there little that can be done to 
prevent accidents.  
Nevertheless, Mearns and colleagues (2004) compared high accident installations 
(HAI; installations with a high number of accidents) with low accident installations (LAI; 
installations with a low number of accidents) to investigate the employees’ view of safety and 
safety performance. The results showed that employees on the HAIs were in more agreement 
with the statements of prioritizing operational goals before safety goals than employees on 
LAIs. Also, employees on HAIs relied on themselves to detect possible errors in the safety 
systems as opposed to relying on their colleagues (Mearns et al., 2004). These findings 
indicate that employees who emphasize production goals rather than safety regulations, as 
well as exhibiting deviant behavior by ignoring the organization’s safety protocols, might 
result in being more exposed to injuries, accidents and near misses at the workplace. 
Furthermore, Hobbs and Williamson (2002) argued that employees who violate and 
avoid safety rules and regulations may experience more work-quality accidents, meaning 
incidents that occur as a result of maintenance-quality problems that affect work operations. 
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They categorized such errors as skill-based errors, which occur when the employees have the 
necessary skills and knowledge, but their attention is diverted from the task, which is more 
likely to result in workplace injuries. 
Situation Awareness  
In 1995, Endsley depicted a model of situation awareness which is commonly 
accepted as an eloquent concept to describe the phenomenon of the process of “knowing what 
is going on” in a dynamic environment. Situation awareness entails the mere understanding of 
the situation as well as the integrated meaning of the present elements when personal goals 
are taken into account, and it constitutes the basis upon which decisions are being made. 
Dynamic environments are characterized by the need of making many decisions across a 
given period of limited time. The successful operation of such environments is dependent on 
accurate and continuous analysis of the situation. However, as situations increase in 
complexity, the more difficult it is for the operator to acquire situation awareness and making 
appropriate decisions in dynamic environments. Such situations have a wide range from 
everyday activities such as walking or driving in heavy traffic, to piloting an airplane or 
working in high-risk environments in the offshore industry.  
In the present study, we have decided to utilize Endsley’s (1995) conceptualization of 
situation awareness because we argue that her description of the phenomenon is the most 
useful in our context of research. Endley’s conceptualization of situation awareness is not 
unchallenged, however, several theorists have postulated corresponding explanatory 
frameworks with different perspectives (e.g. the perceptual cycle model by Smith & Hancock, 
1995; and the activity theory model by Bedny & Meister, 1999; see Woods & Sarter, 2010 for 
review). Different theoretical and methodological perspectives have been applied in different 
spheres of human performance. Patrick and Morgan (2010) argue that to enable researchers to 
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grasp the complexity of psychological processes involved in the operations of dynamic 
systems, situation awareness is insufficient by itself. They specify that to enable detailed 
analyses of task performance, one will need to conduct a detailed task-specific analysis that 
accompanies the situation awareness evaluation. As Patrick and Morgan mention, situation 
awareness does not introduce any additional psychological constructs, rather it incorporates 
already postulated ones. Nevertheless, it is highly challenging to correctly distinguish and 
assess the scope of each process underlying the situation awareness. Rather, the 
conceptualization of situation awareness provides researchers in field settings with an 
adequate proxy of the underlying constructs it entails, taken into account the time-consuming 
process of task-analyses and the diversity of tasks performed by operators who are selected 
for their study.   
Furthermore, Endsley (1995) emphasizes that there are individual varieties regarding 
one’s ability to acquire situation awareness, given the same input. This is due to individual 
differences in experiences, abilities, and training, as well as other factors that function as 
cognitive filters through which information is selected for further attention and interpretation 
of the environment. Therefore, situation awareness is task- and person-dependent.  
According to Endsley (1995), situation awareness is a term applied to the state of 
knowledge in which one has completed the necessary situation assessments required to 
perceive and process the information available in the environment. Situation awareness is 
essential in many environments. Situation awareness, decision-making, and performance are 
all part of the operation of any situation, and these elements affect each other through 
feedback loops. However, it is important to note that they are separate constructs. Situation 
awareness is the foundation upon which an operator makes a decision. For example, a well-
trained operator may make a wrong decision if their situation awareness is incorrect, and 
performance may be affected negatively by a wrong decision.  
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Endsley (1995) divided situation awareness into three levels: Level 1 entails the 
perception of relevant elements in the environment; Level 2 entails the synthesis of Level 1-
elements to create comprehension, and finally, Level 3 entails the projection of future events 
based on the current situation. These levels constitute interdependent processes that hinge on 
the lower-levels’ success in order to succeed themselves.  
Situation awareness has proven to be highly applicable in naturalistic settings to the 
series of underlying psychological processes and products of which situation awareness 
consists (e.g. Klein et al., 2003). Usually, dynamic situations in which situation awareness is 
crucial to select an appropriate course of action to be selected do not happen in a vacuum 
consisting only of an operator and a few environmental elements. Rather, they happen in 
intricate and advanced systems consisting of automated actors, colleagues and, shifting and 
competing goals, all of which demand continuous cognitive processing of the operators in the 
system (Endsley, 1995). Accordingly, it is possible to study situation awareness in several 
ways, examples of which include shared- and distributed situation awareness. Firstly, shared 
situation awareness refers to the degree to which members of a team share mental 
representations of concerns that are relevant for the whole team (Endsley, 1995). Distributed 
situation awareness on the other hand, refers to a situation awareness held by all components 
in a system (Stanton et al. 2006). This approach assumes that cognitive processes occur at the 
system-level rather than just the individual level. Additionally, it holds that situation 
awareness is held by both human and non-human elements (i.e. technological devices such as 
a smoke detector) of the system.  
 
Situation awareness and human error. Lack of sufficient situation awareness is 
often characterized as the source of accidents caused by human error: Sneddon, Mearns, and 
Flin (2006) conducted a study in which they used accident reports from the offshore drilling 
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industry to investigate at which levels of situation awareness the accident originated. Their 
results showed that 66.7 % occurred at Level 1.20 % at Level 2, and 13.3 % at Level 3. 
However, due to the reporting default mode of blaming the lack of Level 1 situation 
awareness, they claim that the other levels may have been underreported. Sneddon and 
colleagues (2006) reported that the main reasons for the failure to detect critical signals were 
distractions, removing focus from the current task, as well as an inability to prioritize 
information resulting in information overload. Furthermore, Sneddon, Mearns, and Flin 
(2013) found that lower levels of their construct work situation awareness was a strong 
indicator of participation in risk behavior. Their findings highlight the importance of holding 
accurate situation awareness in the event of critical situations, otherwise, employees may be 
more likely to execute unsafe actions. 
Previous studies have shown that expectations held by the operator regarding the 
system environment, guide their attentional focus towards important elements (e.g. lack of an 
expected sound; Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). In other words, top-down processes in which 
previously acquired knowledge about the system’s qualities and characteristics, dictates how 
attention shifts across time, space, and function (Woods & Sarter, 2010). Further, Woods and 
Sarter (2010) explain how in a physical environment, humans can focus on what they deem 
interesting in their visual field. Although this relationship may seem uncomplicated, the fact 
is that what is deemed interesting depends on the relationship between elements within their 
environment, as well as the operator and system’s goals and expectancies. Hence, control of 
attention is a fluent and active analysis, constantly in search of what is interesting as well as 
re-defining interestingness based on context-dependent criteria.  
 
Situation awareness and naturalistic decision-making. The naturalistic decision- 
making community arose in the 1980s with ground-breaking descriptions of how people in 
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real-world settings make decisions (Klein, 2008). Orasanu and Connolly (1993) described 
naturalistic decision-making as the decision-making process commenced in situations where 
problems are ambiguous and goals are shifting and competing, where action feedback loops 
are informing the operator about their action’s consequences, time pressure, and multiple 
active components (e.g. work colleagues and moving elements). Up until that point, the 
majority of theoretical understandings on the topics of human decision-making and judgments 
were based on research conducted in laboratory settings (Klein, 2008). Naturalistic decision-
making researchers sought to investigate how people in complex situations made decisions. 
Such research was set in field settings, examining professional groups (e.g. firefighters; Klein, 
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010), with high stakes in instances when operations were 
characterized as successful. This wave of research in naturalistic decision-making resulted in 
parallel discoveries that decisions in such settings were not made by the use of analytical 
option comparisons, but rather that people used their prior experiences to form a mental 
representation of the situation to rapidly characterize the situation, a characteristic titled 
skilled intuition (see Kahneman & Klein, 2009, for a full review). In other words, findings 
from naturalistic decision-making research shifted the conception of decision-making as 
domain-independent, to an understanding that decision-making is hugely knowledge-
dependent, and therefore expertise-dependent (i.e. domain-dependent; Klein, 2008). 
Additionally, the process of decision-making was conceptually expanded to include a prior 
process of perception and recognition (i.e. situation assessment; Klein, 2008).  
Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco (2010) conducted a revolutionary study 
within the field of naturalistic decision-making. They studied experienced firefighters who 
were in situations with severe time-pressure with the need for rapid decision-making. They 
found that the firefighters’ ability to manage decision points was dependent on their ability to 
recognize the situation they were in, as a typical case of their existing prototype-repertoire 
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that they had developed through work experience. Prototype situations consisted of causal 
explanations of the situational dynamics, which supplied them with situation-specific 
expectancies, and suggestions of courses of actions. Klein and colleagues (2010) found that in 
most cases, these firefighters only considered one action-option before deciding to proceed. 
As a result of this study, the recognition-primed decision model was created. This model 
explains how experts in a specific field can make intuitive and suitable decisions with the help 
of very little time, as part of their skill. Simon (1992) defines intuition as a speedy form of 
problem-solving in which people are unable to describe the processes conducted to produce 
the answer. Furthermore, Simon (1992) described this phenomenon to occur in situations 
where adequate and valid cues are available (i.e. recognition), which subsequentially triggers 
access to information stored in memory, and this information provides the answer. Thus, 
intuition is a kind of recognition.  
Reporting Attitudes 
Organizations in the maritime industry have developed extensive reporting systems, 
which include reporting all minor incidents, near-misses, accidents, and equipment defaults 
and failures. However, there are cultural differences between companies concerning the use of 
different reporting systems, and often such systems lack a strong theoretical core regarding 
psychological factors (Gordon, Flin, & Mearns 2005). Furthermore, Gordon and colleagues 
concluded that systems lack human error coding and that the personnel's understanding of 
psychological factors related to accidents was unsatisfactory. Reason (2000) argues that it is 
essential to develop a good reporting culture to effectively manage risks in an organization. 
Without reporting procedures and detailed analysis of events, it would be hard to assess what 
factors contributed to the events to identify possible errors in work operations and 
organizational system defaults. Therefore, it is crucial to report all incidents on board, as this 
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may be considered the most efficient and recognized form of communication between the 
vessels and the management. Developing positive reporting attitudes and substantial reporting 
systems are essential for notifying incidents, clarifying the instigation of an event, and making 
sure important details of the event do not get lost in communication. 
Employee attitudes towards safety play an essential role in influencing the degree to 
which employees comply with the safety regulations and protocols in an organization 
(Hjellvik et al., in press). Early psychological research showed that specific behavioral 
intentions predicted behavior, and this relationship was dependent on the attitude towards the 
act, the so-called theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), as well as the perceived 
expectations of the work environment (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973). In other words, the 
likelihood of an employee executing the specific behavior is dependent on their behavioral 
intention, their attitudes and the perceived expectations from their co-workers and the 
management.  
 As mentioned above, Reason (2000) suggested that latent failures are easier to 
foresee, making it possible for a proactive approach to accidents by identifying the recurrent 
errors and system failures in the organization. Based on this information, we can presume that 
having established sufficient protocols for reporting accidents and near misses, as well as 
positive attitudes towards reporting can help identify the system failures breaching the safety 
barriers in the organization. Employees may not inherently see the value of reporting near-
misses since it did not result in an accident, however, identifying these smaller active failures 
may uncover underlying system failures that can generate accidents in the future. Therefore, 
reviewing reports on accidents and near misses are essential for creating a proactive system 
for identifying and reducing accidents (Psarros, Skjong, & Eide, 2010).  
Kongsvik, Fenstad, and Wendelborg (2012) found a positive relationship between 
safety climate and levels of reporting, suggesting that employees with a positive safety 
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climate are more likely to report accidents and near misses. When controlling for the 
perceived pressure towards efficiency demands, the quality of feedback from the shipping 
company, and short-term contracts, only the safety climate component regarding the 
employee’s opinion on how safety is prioritized on board was significant.  
The reliability of self-reporting reflects the employees’ ability and motivation to report 
accurately (Hjellvik, Aga, & Sætrevik, in press). The reliability of the reporting systems, 
compliance to the management's safety regulations, and risk behavior may be affected by 
desirability bias, in which some employees may report themselves more favorable in terms of 
the preferred attitudes and behavior of the management (Hjellvik et al., in press). Negative 
attitudes towards reporting systems might be a result of lackadaisicalness or ignorance 
regarding the importance of reporting incidents. Since the management requires reporting for 
all incidents, employees reporting a more favorable attitude may wish to present themselves 
as complying with the organizational rules and requirements. We suggest that including 
reporting attitudes in the present study will yield valuable information about the employees' 
perspectives of the organizational reporting systems, and how the interaction of reporting 
attitudes and safety values may represent safety on board offshore vessels.  
Social Desirability Bias 
The idea of including desirable responding is to detect responders that are trying to 
give an unrealistically good impression of themselves, instead of choosing responses that 
reflect their true feelings (e.g. Grimm, 2010). It is suggested that detecting the extent of the 
desirability bias in surveys is essential for data quality and producing ethical and valuable 
results, thus, one should include desirability testing as often as possible (Grimm, 2010). 
Desirability bias is the tendency to underestimate the likeliness of engaging in undesirable 
actions and overestimate the likeliness of engaging in desirable actions (Chung & Monroe, 
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2003). Research has demonstrated that higher desirability bias is associated with unethical 
actions, suggesting that employees are more likely to underestimate the likelihood of 
performing unethical actions (Chung & Monroe, 2003).  
High scores would indicate that the responders have endorsed most of the highly 
desirable items, which are highly improbable to happen in real life. However, it is important 
to note that the negative side to removing high scores is that one may also remove the most 
disciplined respondents that naturally score higher, because they are mixed with the deceiving 
responders.  
In the current study, participants from a single shipping company are included. For 
instance, measuring the employees’ attitudes towards reporting systems, and whether they 
comply with the safety procedures in an organization, may coax the employees into 
responding more desirably. In the current study, we have included desirability responding to 
control for employees who present themselves inaccurately. 
 The Broaden-and-Build Theory 
In the present study, we have adopted a proactive safety approach using the broaden-
and-build theory as the theoretical framework, to interpret the results and implications of our 
findings. In 1998, Fredrickson postulated the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions 
and affect. 
It suggests that the experience of positive emotions and affect extend an individual’s 
momentary attention capacities and cognition, and thus facilitates flexible and creative 
thinking. Thereupon, the broadened cognition will support successful adaptation to stress, and 
will with the aid of time, build lasting positive psychological resources (especially resilience 
characteristics). Examples of such are adaptive coping strategies, positive personality traits, 
and enhanced social support (e.g. Gloria, Faulk, & Steinhardt, 2013; Danner, Snowdon, & 
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Friesen, 2001). Fredrickson’s theory emphasizes the importance of positive affect’s signaling 
effect to the body of optimal functioning to maintain homeostasis, as well as being 
responsible for producing optimal functioning both at present of the positive emotion’s 
occurrence and in a long-term perspective, by promoting the individual to seek out new 
information and maintain social relations. According to Fredrickson’s theory, the opposite 
pattern can be observed in individuals who experience low levels of positive affect (see Kuhl, 
2000 for review), in which they tend to have narrower scopes of attention and cognition. This 
is thought to be caused by the fight-or-flight response, which functions by restricting an 
individual’s cognitive span to ensure quick decisions to immediately alleviate the perceived 
adversity (Gloria et al., 2013). Although this response is adaptive in critical situations that 
pose as life- and health-threatening, it may have a negative effect when activated by stressors 
characterized by their longevity and consistent nature, such as negative aspects present in 
offshore workers’ day-to-day life (e.g. long work periods at sea, separation from family, and 
omnipresent concerns regarding safety; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 1997; Valdersnes, Eid, Hystad, 
& Nilsen, 2017). Gloria and colleagues (2013) demonstrated the building-effects of positive 
affect. They conducted a cross-sectional study among teachers and found that positive affect 
had a direct negative effect on burnout and simultaneously a direct positive effect on 
resilience. Furthermore, they also found that positive affect completely mediated the 
relationship between work stress and resilience, confirming the power of positive affect in 
predicting successful adaptation to stress.  
Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) conducted an experimental study in which they 
induced positive, neutral, and negative affect in participants before they completed two well-
known tasks of creative problem solving, both of which required divergent and convergent 
thinking (The candle task by Duncker, 1945; and Mednick’s Remote Associates Task, 1962). 
Isen and colleagues (1987) compared the performance of the groups and found that positive 
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affect drastically improved creative performance, while neutral and negative affect did not 
affect performance. It is plausible to surmise that positive affect activated individuals’ ability 
of cognitive flexibility. Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, Jung-Beeman, and Mark (2009) 
confirmed the findings from the Remote Associates Task, as well as discovering that 
participants in a positive mood were more likely to report a sensation of insight when the 
answer occurred to them.  
Several suggestions have been presented to explain why positive affect improves 
creative thinking. One is Kuhl’s (2000) affect-modulation hypothesis, which claims that 
positive affect promotes activation of associative networks, whereas negative affect restricts 
activation. Increased activation in associative networks would help explain increased 
creativity in the form of divergent thinking. Several studies (e.g. Gasper, 2004; Gasper & 
Clore, 2002; Bauman & Kuhl, 2005) have shown that positive affectivity also influences 
processing-mode, whereby positive affectivity makes people favor a global processing style 
(e.g. reporting that the stimuli presented is an overall shape, for instance, a square is made up 
of smaller geometric shapes, such as triangles), and negative affectivity produces a local 
processing preference (e.g. reporting that stimuli presented are a collection of geometric 
shapes, not mentioning what shape they comprise). Although affectivity can impact 
processing-mode, the effect is context-dependent.  
Gasper (2004) found that the effect only persisted in situations where participants were 
presented with ambiguous stimuli, and it was thereby concluded that affect alters ambiguous 
judgment situations and hence, does not consistently guide attention. Finally, affect did not 
have an influence on processing-mode when feelings were deemed task-irrelevant by the 
participants. Nevertheless, affect’s influence on processing-mode should not be dismissed: 
Bauman and Kuhl (2005) conducted a series of experiments on local versus global processing 
patterns, in which they discovered that participants induced with positive affect had a greater 
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ability to switch from their dominant response alternative (i.e. global) to their non-dominant 
response alternative (i.e. local) when task-requirements granted they had to. These results 
demonstrate how positive affect also facilitates cognitive flexibility by easing the access to 
different cognitive perspectives. A plausible implication of such an effect, is the possibility 
that positive affect may reduce the likelihood of avoiding cognitive fixation during problem-
solving- and judgment-tasks. Correspondingly, Bolte, Goschke, and Kuhl (2003) found that 
positive affect improved the ability to make intuitive judgments in a word-coherence task.  
In addition to the broadening- and building-effects of positive affect, positive emotions 
have also been found to have an “undoing effect” of negative emotions. For example, 
Fredrickson and Levenson (1998) found that the experience of certain negative emotions, in 
accordance with their well-established association with action tendencies, increased 
cardiovascular activity. More importantly, they found that a subsequent experience of induced 
and naturally occurring positive emotions had the effect of recovering those cardiovascular 
arousal indicators. In brief, such findings support the notion of the undoing effect, by 
demonstrating how positive affect has the potential to quell adverse physiological processes.  
The Aim of our Study 
This study investigates the interaction of several positive individual factors, and how 
they may affect each other, as well as how they may affect proximal safety measures 
(situation awareness, risk behavior, and reporting attitudes). Furthermore, the present study 
aims to contribute with a framework that demonstrates how operators’ positive individual 
factors as well as positive influences in the work-environment may help prevent accidents at 
several organizational levels (i.e. management-, team-, and individual-level). We suggest that 
the broaden-and-build effect of positive affect is present in safety-critical organizations, by 
broadening offshore workers’ attention scope and building resilience over time. Acquiring an 
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abundant thought-behavior repertoire should provide operators in critical organizations with a 
broadened attention of details in their environment and a diverse set of decision-options, 
providing them with a greater chance of deciding a satisfactory solution to the problem. 
Furthermore, there is reason to suspect that the resilience-building effect of positive affect 
will provide the employees the means to overcome negative experiences and influences, such 
as previous accidents and the omnipresent stress related to their workplace.  
This study aims to identify cognitive, affective, and personality factors that contribute 
to safer offshore operations. Our study aims to provide a proactive toolbox to determine 
which individual factors might predict safety outcomes and to suggest ways in which they 
may be improved. We investigate the relationships between psychological capital, safety 
climate, situation awareness, risk perception, risk behavior, reporting attitudes, and job 
satisfaction in a Norwegian offshore shipping company. While controlling for desirable 
responding bias, we wish to determine how much these variables employ an effect on the 
shipping company’s propensity to experience accidents. Our findings may have use in 
improving training, recruitment and selection, and optimize safety protocols.  
To reduce the number of accidents in the offshore industry, it is important to identify 
underlying factors that contribute to the development of incidents. We believe that knowledge 
of the underlying factors contributing to the development of an accident will enable proactive 
and reactive actions, leading to a reduction of accident rates.  
As discussed above, safety climate, job satisfaction, risk perception, and risk behavior 
have been associated with a decrease of injuries and accidents in previous studies and are 
considered important factors in maintaining safety on board offshore vessels. Building on 
previous research, we are interested in detecting interactions between the individual factors 
(e.g. PsyCap and safety climate) and cognitive information-processes (e.g. situation 
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awareness and risk perception), and how they may lead to a better understanding of the 
important features for avoiding major accidents and maintaining safety.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. We predict that employees who utilize their positive resources and 
optimistic characteristics, experience their working environment as more positive and more 
supportive of safety protocols, and are more satisfied with their work tend to have a better 
understanding and control in a safety-critical situation. From this we draw hypothesis 1: 
higher levels of psychological capital, safety climate, and job satisfaction will predict an 
increase in situation awareness. 
Hypothesis 2. We predict that employees who have an accurate assessment and 
awareness of safety-critical situations and who demonstrate more control in such situations 
will be less likely to participate in unsafe actions that may provoke an accident, due to their 
capacity to understand such situations and the potential hazardous outcomes. From this, we 
suggest hypothesis 2: Situation awareness will have a negative effect on risk behavior.  
Hypothesis 3. We predict that employees working in an environment that reflects their 
personal safety values and priorities are likely to positively influence their attitudes regarding 
reporting regulations and systems in the organization. Accordingly, employees’ contentment 
of the work situation will strengthen their motivation to comply with reporting systems. From 
this, we introduce hypothesis 3: Safety climate and reporting attitudes will be positively 
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The sample consisted of 127 seafarers working in a Norwegian offshore shipping 
company operating worldwide. The mean age of respondents was 41.2 (SD = 1.97), with a 
range of 18-65. The average length of their seafaring career was 20.6 years (SD = 1.26). The 
majority of the sample was Norwegian (53.5 %), followed by Oceanian (21.3 %), Nordic (7.1 
%), Argentinian (6.3 %), other European (7.1 %), Canadian (3.9 %), and others (0.8 %). 
Sex was not recorded to ensure the perceived anonymity of all participants, seeing as 
only a small minority in the shipping company is female. No incentives were provided as a 
means of reimbursement. Other demographic variables, such as the department of work, work 
role, length of career, length of shift (in weeks), type of vessel, and employment status, are 
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Table 1 
Demographic Variables 
Variable N % 





























Work role  
Captain 
Chief Officer 
2nd/ 3rd Officer 
























Weeks on board 































Note. The table shows categories, number of participants (N), and percentages of participants 
(%) of the demographic variables.  
Measures 
Safety Climate. Safety climate was measured using the Brief Safety Climate 
Questionnaire (NORSCI-11; Nielsen, Eid, Hystad, Sætrevik, & Saus, 2013). The measure 
consists of 11 items concerning the perceptions of safety climate in the workgroup. The scale 
is divided into three subscales: i) individual intention and motivation, comprised of four 
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items; ii) management prioritization, comprised of four items; and iii) safety routines, 
comprised of three items. Sample items include: “Safety has top priority when I do my job”; 
“In practice concern for production precedes the concern for health, environment and safety”; 
and “The safety deputies’ suggestions are taken seriously by the management”. The responses 
were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly 
agree. Four negatively formulated items were reversed. The sum of every item creates a 
second-order factor that measures the employees’ general feelings of safety. See Appendix A 
for the full questionnaire. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the overall safety climate scale was   = 
.69, with a skewness of -0.11 and kurtosis 0.18.  
Psychological capital. Psychological capital was measured using the PsyCap 
questionnaire (PCQ-24; Luthans, Avolio, Avey, & Norman, 2007). The construct consists of 
four dimensions: hope, efficacy, resiliency, and optimism. The measure contains 24 state-like 
items suitable for the workplace. Each dimension contains six items. Samples of the items 
include: “If I should find myself in a jam at work, I could think of many ways to get out of it 
(hope); “I feel confident in representing my work area in meetings with management” 
(efficacy); “I usually take stressful things at work in stride” (resiliency); and “I always look 
on the bright side of things regarding my job” (optimism). The responses were scored on a 6-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, to 6 = strongly agree. Three negatively 
formulated items were reversed. See Appendix B for the full questionnaire. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha for the overall PsyCap scale showed a high reliability ( = .86), with a skewness of 
0.31 and kurtosis of 0.41.  
Job satisfaction. Job Satisfaction was measured using the short version job 
satisfaction scale (Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 2011). The scale consists of five 
items, a sample includes: “I feel fairly satisfied with my present job”. Two items negatively 
formulated items were reversed. The responses were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging 
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from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree. See appendix C for the full questionnaire. 
The scale had a high reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .86). For the total job satisfaction scale 
skewness was -0.82, and kurtosis 1.6.  
Situation awareness. Situation awareness was measured using the Situation 
Awareness Inventory (Sætrevik, 2013). The scale contains 13 items, asking to what extent the 
employees have accurate representations of safety aspects in their work environments. The 
scale is composed of three subscales, in accordance with Endsley’s (1995) conceptualization 
of situation awareness. Level 1 consists of four items and refers to the perceptual stage of 
situation awareness. Level 2 consists of five items and refers to the comprehension stage of 
situation awareness. Level 3 consists of four items and refers to the projection stage of 
situation awareness. Samples of the items include: “ I notice when an unsafe situation is about 
to arise at my workplace” (level 3); “I know which information is relevant for safety and 
which information is not relevant for safety” (Level 2); and “I sometimes lose track of safety 
due to receiving too much information at the same time” (Level 1). Five negatively 
formulated items were reversed. The responses were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging 
from 1 = completely disagree, to 5 = completely agree. See Appendix D for the full 
questionnaire. The internal consistency of the overall scale was satisfactory (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .79). For the total situation awareness scale skewness was 0.32 and kurtosis 0.60.  
Risk perception scenarios. Risk perception was measured using seven work-related 
scenarios, based on the risk perception inventory (Hellesøy, 1985). To obtain a 
comprehensive measure, the scenarios were doubled up, one that inquired their likeliness of 
being involved in a work-related accident (you-scenarios), and a second that inquired the 
likeliness that colleagues else would be (colleague-scenarios). The items used in the current 
study were used by Valdersnes, Eid, Hystad, and Nielsen (2017) and consist of seven 
scenarios related to ordinary occupational accidents and rare hazards and major accidents. The 
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responses were scored on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = very unlikely, to 6 = very 
likely. See Appendix E for all the items. The you-scenarios had a Cronbach’s Alpha of   = 
.88, with a skewness of 0.54 and kurtosis of 0.09. While the colleague-scenarios had a high 
reliability of   = .91, skewness of 0.35, and kurtosis of 0.18.  
Risk behavior. Risk behavior was measured using an eight-item scale (Sætrevik & 
Hystad, 2017), developed to investigate the likelihood of employees participating in unsafe 
actions that can reduce safety. The items have been adapted from a review of relevant 
literature (e.g. Nielsen, Eid, Hystad, Sætrevik, & Saus, 2013) as well as some of the items that 
may overlap with items from the Safety Behavior scale developed by Rundmo (1994) to 
ensure that it was context-relevant. An example of the items includes: “I have exposed myself 
or others to danger in order to get the job done”. Further, an additional item: “Being busy at 
port makes it difficult for me to maintain safety”, was included in our survey. If this item 
were removed from the scale, the Cronbach’s Alpha of the scale would be reduced to a = .74. 
Three negatively formulated items were reversed. The responses were scored on a 5-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree. See Appendix F for the 
full questionnaire. In the current study, the total risk behavior scale had a high reliability of   
= .77, with a skewness of 0.21, and kurtosis of -0.36. 
Two negatively formulated items in the scale were removed from the survey due to the 
strong similarity of items with the safety climate (NORSCI-11) scale. Since the participants 
responded to these items in the safety climate scale, these items were included in the analysis 
to create a total score of the risk behavior scale. These items were: “I urge colleagues to stop 
work that I believe is being carried out in a risky way”; and “I stop work if I think it may be 
dangerous for me or others to continue”. 
Screening of accident prevalence the past year. Three items regarding participants' 
previous experience with accidents and near misses. Items include: “Have you personally 
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been in a work-related accident involving personal injury on board your vessel during the last 
12 months”; “Have you had a near accident/near miss on board your vessel during the last 12 
months”; and “Have you observed others who have had a work-related accident involving 
personal injury on board your vessel during the last 12 months?” Responses were recorded 
with yes and no.  
Desirability bias. It is important to include desirable responding bias to control for the 
individuals scoring high on this measure, because it may confound the results by concealing 
relationships between variables. Desirable responding was measured using the short version 
of the Balanced Inventory for Desirable Responding (BIDR-16; Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & 
Gebauer, 2015), developed from BIDR-40 (Paulhus, 1991). The measure consists of 16 items, 
in which eight items refer to the self-deceptive enhancements subscale and eight items refer to 
the impression formation subscale.  
An example of a self-deceptive enhancement items is: “Am not always honest”, while 
an item concerning impression formation includes: “Never cover up mistakes”. The responses 
were scored on an 8-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree, to 8 = strongly 
agree. The negatively formulated items were reversed. See Appendix G for the full 
questionnaire. The internal consistency for the total BIDR-16 score in the current study was 
relatively low (  = .68), skewness was 0.05, and kurtosis was 0.15.  
Reporting attitudes. Reporting attitudes were measured using 14 items (Hjellvik, 
Aga, & Sætrevik, in press). Some of the items (inspired by Probst & Graso, 2013; e.g.: “Since 
it's impossible to prevent all unwanted events, we shouldn't spend too much resources on 
reporting”), refer to the assumed consequences of reporting accidents and near misses. Other 
items refer to the motivation to report incidents and the perceived usefulness of reporting 
systems, such as: “I am not motivated to report near-misses”. The items have been developed 
through previous survey data collections, however, note that the items used in the current 
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study have somewhat different wording than Hjellvik, Aga, and Sætrevik. The responses were 
scored on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree, to 5 = Strongly agree. 
Negatively formulated items were reversed. One of the items from the reporting attitude scale: 
“Reports from accidents or dangerous situations are often 'embellished'”, was excluded from 
the survey due to a strong similarity with an item from the safety climate (NORSCI) 
questionnaire, however, it was included in the analyses. See Appendix H for the full 
questionnaire. The Cronbach’s alpha for the overall score was   = .68, with a skewness of -
0.40, and kurtosis of 0.32. 
 
Design and Procedure  
This project was approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (Norsk Senter 
for Forskningsdata). Following this, we completed the pre-registration of the project, 
including our hypotheses, planned analyses, and instruments we included in the survey 
(Authors, 2019). Participants were recruited via emails sent to 120 crew members in senior 
positions working on board 40 different vessels in a large Norwegian shipping company. 
These included captains, first and second officers, and chief engineers. Emails were sent to 
the crews’ professional emails over the span of two shifts to ensure that all the seafaring 
employees of the shipping company were able to complete the survey while on board. The 
employees were ensured that participation was completely anonymous. Emails contained 
information regarding the research project and a participation hyperlink that guided them to 
the project’s SurveyXact webpage. Upon agreeing to participate, participants were given more 
extensive information about the content of the project, and they were informed about the 
implications of participation. Participants were informed of their rights to, at any time, 
withdraw from the study, edit or delete their responses without having to justify their decision 
to do so (see Appendix I). The second page contained information about the use of their 
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personal identification markers that would enable them to at a later point withdraw or edit. 
Completion of the survey was expected to take 30 minutes. Following completion of the 
survey, the final page contained a debriefing document (see appendix J). Responses from 
participants were automatically recorded and available for the researchers via SurveyXact. 
The shipping company never gained access to the employees’ responses, to protect the 
participants from being held liable, on the ground of their responses, by the company. The 
analyses were conducted using SPSS Windows version number 25, and for the mediation 
analysis to test hypothesis 3, Hayes’ (2017) model 4 was used in PROCESS version 3.3 in 
SPSS.  
The original dataset included all 460 seafarers who had opened the link form the 
recruitment email. Of these, 290 had exited the site before proceeding to the next page, and a 
further 42 participants were removed from the dataset due to incomplete answers of the 
survey. Inspection of the identification markers indicated that one participant had completed 
the survey twice. A decision was made to remove the response recorded the second time, 
indicated by the length of shift. Consequently, the data set used for analyses consisted of 127 
participants’ responses. Further five participants were excluded from the analyses due to 
extreme scores of social desirability relative to the rest of the sample, indicated by scores 
higher than two standard deviations away from the mean. Outliers were not removed from the 
dataset, as they were not considered extreme outliers. 
 
Exploratory Analyses  
Exploratory analyses were included in the study. First, we investigated whether the 
employees’ situation awareness predicted their risk perception, regarding the likelihood of 
risks involving themselves. Following this, we executed a corresponding analysis to examine 
if situation awareness predicted their risk perceptions regarding their colleagues’ likelihood of 
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experiencing accidents. Secondly, we included an analysis to investigate if risk perception 
predicted risk behavior. As previously discussed, this relationship is complex and has 
previously shown dubious results. We expected that the relationship between risk perception 
and risk behavior could give us information on whether the employees’ perception of risk is 
associated with the frequency of risk behavior displayed in the company.                                                                                                       
Deviations from Pre-Registration  
The study was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework’s website before data 
analyses were initiated. The registration describes the hypotheses, data collection, and 
planned analyses, as it is meant to warrant transparency and meticulousness of the scientific 
process. However, due to unforeseen time delays, we made some alterations in the study 
which deviates from the pre-registration (Authors, 2020). Importantly, these alterations were 
made before viewing and analyzing the data. With time limitations by delaying the 
distribution of the survey, and the vastness of this study, we decided to exclude the following 
variables: hardiness, The Big five personality traits and accident frequency. Following these 
alterations, hypotheses 4 and 5 will not be tested in this project. Hypothesis 4 stated: a 
multiple regression analysis where psychological capital and situation awareness are 
independent variables, and risk behavior is the dependent variable were excluded. Hypothesis 
5 stated: a multiple regression where situation awareness is the independent variable, accident 
frequency is the dependent variable, and the relationship is moderated by risk behavior. We 
had to deviate from the pre-registration on some parts of the data collection and analyses due 
to unforeseen issues. An updated pre-registration was therefore uploaded to the Open Science 
Framework’s website before initiating the data analyses (See appendix K). 
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Results  
Confirmatory Analyses 
To test the first hypothesis, as described in the pre-registration, a multiple linear 
regression was performed to test whether psychological capital, safety climate, and job 
satisfaction would predict situation awareness. A significant regression equation was found, F 
(3, 118) = 22.3, p < .001. Participants’ assessments of situation awareness are equal to 13.93 
+ .229 (PsyCap) + .261 (safety climate) - .075 (job satisfaction). Two predictor variables 
contributed significantly to the prediction of situation awareness: PsyCap (β = 0.49, p < .001), 
and safety climate (β = 0.26, p < .005). Job satisfaction was not a significant predictor (β = -
0.05, p = .613). Altogether 36.2% of the variability in situation awareness was predicted by 
knowing scores of all three independent variables. The effect size was large with f2 =.57. This 
indicates that the factors overall predicted the level of situation awareness. However, job 
satisfaction did not have a significant contribution, leading to hypothesis 1 to be partially 
supported. The results yield support to the hypothesized association between predictor 
variables PsyCap and safety climate and situation awareness, the outcome variable. The non-
significant relationship between job satisfaction and situation awareness violated our 
hypothesized prediction. The Pearson Correlation coefficients of hypothesis 1 is displayed in 
























Figure 2. The model displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between the predictor and 
the outcome variables in the multiple linear regression.  
***p < .001. 
 
To examine hypothesis 2, as described in the pre-registration, a simple linear 
regression was carried out to test if situation awareness predicted the participants’ 
predisposition to perform risk behavior. The results of the regression indicated that the 
prediction equation was significant, F (1, 120) = 41.6, p < .001. Situation awareness was a 
significant predictor of risk behavior (β = -0.49, p < .001), and situation awareness explained 
25.8 % of the variance in situation awareness. There was a positive predictive relationship 
between situation awareness and risk behavior, yielding support to hypothesis 2. The Pearson 
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Figure 3. The model displays the Pearson correlation coefficient between the predictor and 
the outcome variables in the simple linear regression.  
***p < .001. 
To test hypothesis 3, as described in the pre-registration, a single mediation analysis 
was conducted to determine whether safety climate predicted reporting attitudes mediated 
through job satisfaction. Step one showed that the regression of safety climate on the mediator 
(job satisfaction) was significant, β = 0.247, CI = .138-.355. Step 2 of the mediation model, 
the regression of safety climate ignoring the mediator (i.e. the direct effect), was significant, β 
= 0.515, CI = .307-.723. Step 3 revealed that the relationship between job satisfaction and 
reporting attitudes is significant, when controlling for safety climate, β = 0.549, CI = .229-
.870. Step 4 of the analysis revealed that safety climate was still a significant predictor of 
reporting attitudes when including job satisfaction as the mediator (i.e. the total effect) in the 
model, β = 0.651, CI = .450-.851, t = 6.42, p < .001. The model explains 25.6 % of the 
variance in reporting attitudes, which indicates that the relationship between safety climate 
and reporting attitudes is partially mediated through job satisfaction. Thus, findings support 





















Figure 4. The model displays the standardized regression coefficients for the relationship 
between safety climate in reporting attitudes as mediated by job satisfaction. The standardized 
regression coefficient between safety climate and reporting attitudes, controlling for job 
satisfaction. The indirect effect is in parentheses. 
*** p < .001.  
Exploratory Analyses 
Two of the exploratory analyses concerned risk perception both regarding the 
participants’ likelihood of experiencing seven specific work-related personal injuries and 
secondly their colleagues’ likelihood of experiencing the same injuries. The frequency 
distributions of the responses are presented in Table 2, exhibiting the reported likelihood of 
accident scenarios affecting themselves (i.e. scenario 1) and their colleagues (i.e. scenario 2), 
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Table 2 
Risk perception  
Type of scenario Safe 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Struck by objects in 
motion (e. g. cargo) 
 
94.2 79.5 




Cuts or contact with 
sharp or pointed 
elements  
66.4 48.4 







Slips, trips, falls 
 
50.8 36.9 




Note. Percentage of the participants who felt safe (i.e. those who responded either very 
unlikely, unlikely, or somewhat unlikely, to the questions concerning their perceived 
likelihood of being affected by accident scenarios displayed above). The participants 
responded to the likelihood of these types of accidents concerning themselves (scenario 1) 
and their colleagues (scenario 2). 
 
Testing how situation awareness affects employees’ risk perception is essential for the 
understanding of the controversial nature of risk perception. To achieve a greater 
understanding of how situation awareness affects the perceived likelihood of themselves 
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being involved in an accident (scenario 1), versus their colleagues (scenario 2). Simple 
regression analyses of the two perceptual risk scenarios were therefore conducted. In the first 
simple regression analysis, situation awareness score was used to predict the scores on risk 
perception scenario 1, regarding personal risks of being harmed at work, measured on a scale 
indicating the perceived likelihood of occurrence. A significant negative regression equation 
was found, F(1, 120) = 6.2, p < .05, where situation awareness score explained 4.9 % of the 
variance in personal risk perception. Employees’ assessment of their work-related risks was 
equal to 30.8 - .281 (situation awareness score).  
Correspondingly, a simple linear regression was calculated to predict employees’ 
assessments of the likelihood of colleagues experiencing the identical work-related accidents 
based on situation awareness score. A significant negative regression equation was found, F 
(1, 120) = 6.9, p < .01, where situation awareness explained 5.4 % of the variance in risk 
perception. Employees’ assessment of their colleagues’ work-related risks was equal to 37.3 - 
.338 (situation awareness score).  
We decided to explore the complex and controversial nature of the relationship 
between risk perception and risk behavior, in light of the findings from hypothesis 2, which 
determined that situation awareness negatively predicted risk behavior. To elaborate on these 
findings, we sought to determine whether the participation in risk behavior may be caused by 
an inaccurate risk perception, indicated by a lack of situation awareness, as established 
through the first two exploratory analyses. Therefore, a simple linear regression was 
conducted applying risk perception as the predictor of risk behavior. The results revealed a 
very small, but significant positive effect, F (1, 120) = 7.9, p < .01, where risk perception 
explained 6.1 % of the variance in risk behavior. The employees’ likelihood of partaking in 
risk behavior was equal to 13.7 + .19 (risk perception).  
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Discussion 
To investigate the protective effects of positive individual characteristics on accident 
prevention on board offshore vessels, we examined how PsyCap, safety climate, job 
satisfaction, and reporting attitudes, relate to factors known as antecedents of accident rates, 
namely situation awareness and risk behavior. A major strength of the present study is that we 
controlled for social desirability bias, a factor known to endow distorted responses on self-
reported items that represent an inclination to communicate an adulterated response to present 
a more likable version of oneself. Generally, our results yield support to the notion that 
improving and promoting the acquisition of positive individual characteristics will result in a 
reduction of accident rates. Our findings support the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 
1998) as well as the social exchange theory (Blau, 1986) in a safety-critical organization.   
Summary of Findings  
The present study found positive predictive effects of PsyCap and safety climate on 
situation awareness, with a considerable effect size. This adds additional support to the notion 
that PsyCap and safety climate influence the ability to achieve accurate situation awareness. 
There was an absence of a relationship between job satisfaction and situation awareness, as 
predicted by our first hypothesis. Thus, the findings did not support the theoretical assumption 
that job satisfaction influenced situation awareness, resulting in only partial support of our 
first hypothesis.  
Our findings support the well-established negative relationship between individuals’ 
situation awareness and their willingness to partake in risk behavior, supporting our second 
hypothesis. This indicates that employees with an accurate situation awareness are less likely 
to engage in unsafe behavior. Possibly, this could be due to the employees accurately 
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perceiving and comprehending the information and associated risks in the given situation and 
therefore, acting accordingly.  
Our results for the mediation analysis, demonstrates that the relationship between 
safety climate and reporting attitudes is partially mediated through job satisfaction, supporting 
our third hypothesis. In other words, employees who consider safety concerns to be of great 
relevance, as well as being more likely to agree with the management’s safety prioritizations 
(i.e. safety climate) are more inclined to have a positive attitude towards and willingness to 
report accidents and unwanted incidents (i.e. reporting attitudes). This positive relationship 
increases moderately when employees are simultaneously satisfied with their work-situation 
(i.e. job satisfaction), meaning that employees with higher levels of safety climate and job 
satisfaction are more likely to have positive reporting attitudes than colleagues who only have 
a high level of safety climate but not job satisfaction.  
Findings from Exploratory Analyses  
The first exploratory analysis revealed a weak negative association between situation 
awareness and risk perception, indicating that for every unit the employee’s situation 
awareness increase, the perceived likeliness that a hazardous event will occur decreases. In 
other words, employees with adequate prerequisites to acquire situation awareness are less 
likely to perceive threats of possible accidents affecting them. These findings may reflect the 
employees’ understanding of a situation, which affects the subsequent assessment of potential 
risks in their work environment. This tendency is essential to understand how perceived 
feelings of threat may be influenced by the ability to achieve the requirements to maintain 
safety: perception of safety cues, understanding how actions affect the outcomes, and project 
knowledge to attain a trajectory of situation development.  
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Correspondingly, the second exploratory analysis showed a weak negative prediction 
of situation awareness on risk perception concerning the employee’s colleagues. Similar to 
the first exploratory analysis, these findings indicate that as employee’s situation awareness 
increases, the perceived likeliness, and concern over a hazardous incident affecting their 
colleagues decreases. Thus, we suggest that employees with an accurate understanding of the 
overall situation will perceive it less likely that an accident will affect their colleagues.  
The last exploratory analysis established a weak positive prediction of risk perception 
on risk behavior, contributing to research on the controversial and complex relationship on 
this topic. We suggest that the relationship between risk perception and risk behavior is a 
consequence of inaccurate situation awareness. More specifically, we suggest that situation 
awareness facilitates accurate risk perception, as indicated by the congruence from hypothesis 
2 and our two previous exploratory analyses. In other words, having realistic expectations of 
the consequences of one’s behavior increases the employees’ ability to perform accurate 
calculations of potential hazards. Furthermore, our results support the findings from Rundmo 
(1996a), indicating that employees who feel less safe are more likely to engage in unsafe 
actions.  
Implications of our Findings  
The findings revealed in the present study highlighted aspects of offshore workers’ 
characteristics and abilities that can be utilized in proactive interventions to maintain and 
advance safety. A proactive approach to safety is enabled through the knowledge of 
underlying contributing factors of accidents. It would in practice entail implementing 
education and training opportunities, defining beneficial recruitment standards for operative 
jobs, constructing helpful design at the workplace, and finally by adjusting organizational 
structures that coincide with this knowledge. 
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Implications of results from hypothesis 1 for safety. PsyCap has previously been 
found to have a positive effect on several safety outcomes (e.g. Schaubroeck, Riolli, Peng, & 
Spain, 2011). Explanations offered to explain this relationship vary from reducing stress 
perception levels (Schaubroeck, Riolli, Peng, & Spain, 2011), to emotional engagement and 
organizational citizenship even in the face of negative reactions to organizational change 
(Avey, Wernsing, & Luthans, 2008), and PsyCap’s ability to function as a buffer against 
worries concerning accidents in circumstances when risks are perceived as low (Valdersnes, 
Eid, Hystad, & Nilsen, 2017). Our results do not grant much opportunity to examine exactly 
what facets of PsyCap that can account for the observed positive relationship with situation 
awareness. However, there is reason to consider the impact of PsyCap’s established 
correlation to positive affect (e.g. Schaubroeck et al., 2011) on the relationship. In terms of 
the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998), it is likely that, for the most part, the 
broadening-effect will have the most considerable effect on Level 1 of situation awareness, 
namely the perception-phase. It is important to note that this would only be the case if the 
operator experienced positive affect at the moment that the critical situation was experienced. 
In particular, this influence may be due to the expanded scope of attention and cognition 
because of heightened engagement in their immediate environment and cognitive flexibility 
allowing operators to switch between global and local processing-modes (Bauman & Kuhl, 
2005). Furthermore, positive affect improves creative performance (Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowicki, 1987) and cognitive flexibility (Bauman & Kuhl, 2005) that will support adaptations 
to encountered stress. Therefore, we suggest that the positive attributions of PsyCap influence 
the employee’s cognitive flexibility when faced with a safety-critical situation, from which 
their momentary attention capacities and broadened cognition facilitates problem-solving. On 
the other hand, employees with a negative PsyCap may have a narrower scope of attention 
and lower cognitive flexibility, which may result in a less accurate understanding of the 
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safety-critical situation due to local processing of the hazardous cues and therefore not being 
able to comprehend the overall situation.   
 The building-effect (e.g. Gloria, Faulk, & Steinhardt, 2013) may also have played an 
important role, mostly concerning situation awareness Level 2 and 3 (i.e. the comprehension 
and projection phases respectively), by improving the employees’ ability to acquire 
prerequisites of situation awareness. For example, if an operator has previously experienced 
critical situations that they reacted to with a problem-focused coping strategy rather than an 
emotion-focused coping strategy, which has been found to be associated to PsyCap 
(Schaubroeck, Riolli, Peng, & Spain, 2011). In such a case, a problem-focused coping 
strategy can be deemed adaptive, because it provides ample learning opportunities, such as 
knowledge related to the system in which they operate. Specifically, the knowledge would 
provide information of protype situations (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010), as 
accidents are considered deviations from normal operation. This knowledge can subsequently 
afford top-down cognitive guidance in future similar situations. If this is the case, the pre-
existing knowledge-repertoires would accelerate the recognition phase included in the 
recognition-primed decision-making model (Klein et al., 2010).  
Ostensibly, the positive relationship between safety climate and situation awareness 
can be explained by the notion that those who consider safety to be a crucial element in their 
work-environment may be more inclined to attentively observe their work-situations to avoid 
accidents. They may also benefit more from training than colleagues with lower levels of 
safety climate due to a more dedicated focus. Furthermore, training outcome is presumably 
dependent on engagement. The shipping company from which we obtained our sample, have 
previously invested in training specialized to improve situation awareness, and this may help 
explain why safety climate predicts situation awareness.  
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In the sense that PsyCap comprises traits that are known to contribute to positive affect 
(e.g. Schaubroeck, Riolli, Peng, & Spain, 2011), and that safety climate augment positive 
affect, our results support the broadened effect of Frederickson’s (1998) broaden-and-build 
theory. We suggest that part of the explanation of the observation of PsyCap coupled with 
safety climate’s positive relationship to situation awareness, lies in the broadening- and 
building-effects of positive affect on situation awareness. Based on our results, we can 
suggest that employees who use a broadened spectrum of positive cognitive resources are 
better equipped to understand the overall situations and predict the development of safety-
critical situations. This may be explained by the employees’ goal-oriented behavior and 
motivation, positive cognitive attributions, and their ability to find alternate pathways to 
succeed when faced with obstacles. Similarly, exhibiting positive attributions and 
expectancies to overcome a challenging situation, as well as employees with the ability to 
adapt and thrive in a safety-critical situation (i.e. resilience) may be more likely to overcome 
the situation.  
Implications of results from hypothesis 2 for safety. Our results show that situation 
awareness predicted risk behavior. This finding confirms previous findings that those who 
have an understanding of situations and their possible consequences do not engage in as much 
risk behavior as those who have a less accurate perception and understanding of situations 
(e.g. Sneddon, Mearns, & Flin, 2006). Particularly, the predictive quality of situation 
awareness suggests that risk behavior is performed as a result of a lack of understanding of 
critical work situations (corresponding to Level 1 and 2 of situation awareness) and the 
inability to correctly project assumptions of how the situation will develop (i.e. Level 3 of 
situation awareness), as a consequence unsuccessful achievement of Level 1 and 2 situation 
awareness. Miscalculations of future events can lead to uninformed and unintentional 
decisions to conduct dangerous behaviors (Rundmo, 1996a). This notion is further 
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strengthened by our exploratory analyses, which revealed that situation awareness negatively 
affects risk perception, both concerning the individual and their colleagues, and that a risk 
perception corresponding to a feeling of unsafety predicts participation in risk behavior. 
Together, these results suggest that situation awareness may as a buffer between a misaligned 
risk perception and the participation in risk behavior.  
We suggest that risk behavior and situation awareness is connected to active failures, 
examples of which include unsafe acts (such as slips, fumbles, and mistakes) and procedural 
violations (Reason, 2000). This assumption builds on the notion that under circumstances 
with poor situation awareness, it could be easier to miscalculate one’s behavioral 
consequences, as mentioned above. We suggest that shipping companies should attempt to 
reduce unsafe actions through interventions that aim to reduce active failures by altering their 
employees’ abilities to achieve accurate situation awareness. This would in turn improve the 
decision-making process, as decisions are made upon the basis of information available 
through situation awareness.  
Employees on board offshore vessels may experience safety-critical situations in 
which they need to make rapid decisions under time-pressure. In accordance with recognition-
primed decision-making (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010), operators rely on the 
cognitive repertoires they have acquired from previous work experiences. Previous research 
has demonstrated that specific training programs intended to facilitate the acquisition of 
accurate situation awareness simultaneously result in improved decision-making (e.g. 
Johnsen, Espevik, Saus, Sanden, & Olsen, 2015). Thus, to make accommodations for 
allowing employees to acquire more accurate situation awareness would ease the decision-
making processes.  
Crucially, unsafe actions do not always lead to accidents, and it is difficult to 
determine the point in which active failures will occur: for instance, determining when 
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adapting work tasks and taking shortcuts will result in negative consequences and hazardous 
situations. However, there will be a higher threat of a safety-critical situation occurring with a 
higher frequency of risk behavior. Therefore, identifying the underlying reasons for active 
failures is essential for creating a proactive approach to reduce future events. Active failures 
caused by operators should arguably be incorporated into the system. If one can identify the 
underlying decision-making processes and situational understanding, it may be easier to 
develop safe behavior that limits hazardous outcomes.  
Implications of results from hypothesis 3 for safety. Our results confirm the 
previously established positive relationship between safety climate and safety behavior (e.g. 
Ayim Gyekye, 2005; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). Findings from the mediation can be 
explained by the notion that employees working in a safety-critical organization who feel as 
though the management prioritizes safety ta an appropriate degree, will probably increase 
their satisfaction with their job.  
Specifically, the positive relationship between safety climate and reporting attitudes 
and between job satisfaction and reporting attitudes, can be understood in the light of the 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1986). According to Blau, expressions of positive affect, 
concern, and consideration from others create a sense of indebtedness in the receiver, and a 
corresponding obligation to return the gesture. In this regard, prosocial behavior initiated by 
one individual will facilitate additional prosocial behavior in others. In the offshore context, 
reporting of safety-dependent circumstances (i.e. accidents and near misses) can be 
understood as prosocial behavior in the sense that it reflects caring behavior (e.g. Yagil & 
Luria, 2010). In other words, the act of executing thorough reporting can be interpreted both 
as a kind gesture and as a gesture that is motivated by the expectation that the favor will 
incline others to reciprocate.   
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A well-established reporting system is important for detecting and identifying 
accidents and near misses in the organization. Following the established safety protocols and 
reporting systems are essential for detecting possible weaknesses in safety management 
systems, such as latent failures (Reason, 2000). As mentioned previously, latent failures can 
lie dormant in the organizational system barriers over long periods of time until they at some 
point influence an accident by error-provoking effects or continuing weaknesses in the system 
(Reason,2000). For instance, identifying consequences of unreliable alarms or 
counterproductive procedures, or identifying errors that constrain operations from being 
performed safely, such as an operator’s lack of experience, time pressure, and inadequate 
equipment, will make interventions in the workplace possible. Based on our findings, we 
suggest that employees with positive perceptions of the management’s safety prioritization, 
with the motivation to follow the organizational safety protocols, and exhibiting positive 
safety values will have more positive attitudes towards reporting accidents and near misses.  
Developing a positive safety climate and reporting attitudes may establish a positive 
reporting culture, in which employees comprehend the value of reporting all accidents and 
near misses to reduce future accidents. A positive reporting culture is also dependent on good 
and effective communication, in which both the employees and the management convey and 
comprehend valuable information of the strengths and weaknesses of the current system in the 
organizations.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations to the current study that may affect the generalizability of 
our results. The response rate of our survey was lower than initially expected, which causes 
the total number of participants to be too low for what is required to run analyses in 
quantitative research, especially analyses comparing means between groups (e.g. ANOVAs). 
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The low number of participants could be the result of several factors. For instance, since the 
survey was distributed at the beginning of December, the data collection may have been 
affected by the holidays. Additionally, to reach both Norwegian and international participants, 
we decided to distribute the English version of the survey. Although English is the official 
language onboard offshore vessels, the majority of the sample population was Norwegian. 
Feedback from participants indicated that they did not feel confident enough to complete the 
survey in their second language. 
The nature of the cross-sectional single wave survey design strictly limits our ability to 
infer causal links between our variables. We therefore advice that findings from the current 
study should interpreted with caution. We suggest that future research looking at the same 
relationship that we have, conduct longitudinal survey designs. This would provide ample 
opportunity to see how the relationships behave over the span of time. An additional benefit 
of the longitudinal approach is that it yields opportunity to investigate effects of naturally 
occurring variabilities, such as for example an accident. Findings from such a finding would 
have high ecological validity.  
Furthermore, without our knowledge, the shipping company administered a separate 
survey as part of their safety monitoring, two weeks before the administration of our study. 
This may have lessened the crew’s motivation to complete our survey. 
Furthermore, the sample population in the current study was from a single shipping 
company. To increase the diversity of the sample population in the study, we included both 
offshore vessels located on the Norwegian continental shelf and those located globally. 
Concerning department of work and work role distributions in our sample, there was an 
evident majority of bridge personnel and leader-type work positions (i.e. captains, officers 
and chief engineers). It is probable that this skewness is caused by the fact that these were the 
work role positions who received the participation email directly from us. This imbalance 
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limits our ability to generalize our findings beyond those employees in high positions. Results 
may therefore not reveal the most stressed employees in lower ranked work roles, due to their 
lacking participation. Karasek (1979) postulated the job strain model, which describes the 
individual’s stress response based on the interplay of two dimensions, namely job demands 
and the individual’s decision-making latitude when faced with these demands. In this setting, 
decision latitude is the constraint that allows for transforming stress, which is conceptualised 
here as “potential energy”, into action energy, thereby circumventing an adverse 
internalisation of the stress. The job strain model has been found do predict adverse health 
outcomes when employees experience high strain and low decision-making opportunities 
(Kalimo, Tenkanen, Härmä, Poppius, & Heinsalmi, 2000). We advise that future research 
replicate the results in a larger and more diverse sample population, including a global 
offshore vessel environment including several shipping companies, to determine the 
reliability of our findings and to better estimate generalizability of the results across different 
cultures and locations. 
We would have appreciated the opportunity to explore and report subscales of the 
instruments included in the survey. However, due to low coherence values in the safety 
climate, reporting attitudes, and the desirability bias scales, we were unable to uncover trends 
in each subcategory. For instance, one may detect variations between the PsyCap dimensions, 
safety climate categories, and the levels of situation awareness. We suggest that future 
research should consider using different instruments with satisfactory reliability scores.  
  The majority of the results in the current study contained small effects, which may 
affect the generalizability of our results. For instance, human emotions and behavior are 
complex where multiple factors can explain and confound the relationship between such 
variables. A large variability may explain why we have low effect sizes on most of our 
findings. It is important to note that we only found markedly small effect sizes when 
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investigating the relationship between situation awareness and risk perception, as well as the 
relationship between risk perception and risk behavior. Therefore, we should be careful to 
draw firm conclusions from the results of the first two exploratory analyses, as there may be 
several other unidentified factors affecting these relationships. However, a lower variability 
level does not negate the fact that most of the analyses were significant, demonstrating an 
existing relationship between the variables. Therefore, based on our results we can make 
inferences about the trends and relations between individual factors that may contribute to 
preventing accidents in our sample size, even if the results may not apply to all offshore 
vessels. 
Although accident and incident frequencies would be beneficial to include in this 
study (as we originally intended, see appendix K for deviations from pre-registration), finding 
reliable data is time-consuming as injuries and accidents are sporadic (Hjellvik, Aga, & 
Sætrevik, in press).  
 
Internal validity of instruments. The present study used a single wave survey design. 
A major limitation of survey design is the risk of incohesive instruments. Our survey 
constituted several instruments, and it was crucial to determine the internal validity of these. 
Cronbach’s alpha is the most common form of measuring the internal consistency of items in 
a survey measure, assessing the average reliability of an instrument (e.g. Hystad, Bartone, & 
Eid, 2014; Bonett & Wright, 2015). However, Sijtsma (2009) argues that Cronbach’s alpha 
generates underestimates of the reliability of the averages. Bonett and Wright (2015) argues 
that there is no universal minimally acceptable reliability value and propose that the reliability 
value should be determined by the type of application and the population reliability value. 
Tharaldsen, Olsen, and Rundmo (2008) suggest that alpha scores are sensitive to the number 
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of items in a scale, therefore, the lower number of items in the scales can to some extent 
explain the low alphas in safety climate, reporting attitudes and desirability bias.  
Previous research using the brief safety climate scale (NORSCI-11) have reported 
acceptable reliability (e.g. Nielsen, Eid, Hystad, Sætrevik, & Saus, 2013; Nielsen, Hystad, & 
Eid, 2016). As discussed above, the Cronbach’s alpha for the overall safety climate scale in 
the current study was lower than appreciated. Most of the items in the NORSCI-scale 
appeared to be worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease of the alpha if deleted. The only 
exception was item eight: “Lack of maintenance has resulted in reduced safety”. One can 
argue that the removal of the item would be beneficial to reach acceptable reliability. 
Exploring this option revealed that the removal of the item did not have a large impact on the 
alpha or the planned analyses. Based on this, we decided to keep the item in the measure.  
Hjellvik, Aga, and Sætrevik (in press) reported a high reliability of their reporting 
attitude scale. It is uncertain why the Cronbach’s alpha in the current study deviates from 
previous studies, potentially, the wording of the items could have impacted the reliability, as 
Hjellvik et al., (in press) use a slightly different wording than the present study. After a closer 
look at the Cronbach’s alpha of the overall reporting attitudes scale, most of the items 
appeared to be worthy of retention, except for two items, item five and 13: “Incident 
investigations are used to find out who is to blame for the incident” and “I report trivial 
matters that have no impact on safety, just because I’m expected to report a given number of 
incidents”. Based on this, future researchers should be wary of these items and consider 
removing them to reach acceptable reliability. 
For the desirability bias scale, Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, and Gebauer (2015) reported low 
internal consistency in their analysis. They argued that the low internal consistency could be 
due to the wide range of representations within the subscales. Most of the items in the 
desirability bias scale appeared to be worth retaining. The only exception was item number 
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14: “Avoid listening”. Arguably, the item is awkwardly phrased, which raises the question of 
whether the item was consistently interpreted across our respondents. 
Concluding Remarks 
Accidents in the offshore industry can have extensive consequences on human lives, 
the environment, and the economy of shipping companies they affect. The present supports 
the broadening-and building-effects of positive individual factors, as specified by the 
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998), in the offshore industry. If offshore shipping 
companies were to implement solutions that result in increasing employees’ resources through 
positive affect, as per our suggestions. Thus, safety could be maintained and accidents 
prevented proactively, resulting in improved safety across the offshore vessel fleet across the 
world. A reduction of accident frequency would assure a more sustainable operation in the 
offshore industry, and it would entail fewer human injuries and losses, it would protect the 
environment through a reduction of pollution in the sea, and it could spare offshore shipping 
companies from costs associated with replacing damages on their fleet. Our findings are 
applicable in other safety-critical organizations as the variables examined are present in 
professions of as doctors, nurses, aircraft pilots, and fire-fighters to mention a few. Future 
research on the topics covered in the present study should include accident and incident 
frequencies to ensure a reliable measure of the safety outcomes and a measure of positive 
affect, to better determine the effects of the broaden-and-build theory’s assumptions.  
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Appendix A  
Safety Climate Questionnaire  
Below are some statements of importance to health, working environment and safety. 
Some statements only apply to the working environment or safety. Based on your current 
work situation, indicate to what degree you agree with the various statements. (The sum of the 
items constitute a second-order factor measuring the general feeling of safety). Mark each 
statement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. (* reversed). 
Individual intention and motivation 
1. I report dangerous situations when I see them 
2. Safety has top priority when I do my job 
3. I ask my colleagues to stop work when I think the task in question is being carried 
out in a risky manner 
4. I stop working if I think it can be dangerous for me or other to continue 
Managements prioritizing 
5. In practice concern for production precedes the concern for health, environment 
and safety * 
6. Reports on accidents or dangerous situations are often “smartened up” * 
7. There are often parallel work operations proceeding that leads to dangerous 
situations* 
8. Lack of maintenance has resulted in reduced safety* 
Safety routines 
9. I have the necessary competence to perform my job in a safe manner 
10. I have easy access to personal protective equipment 
11. The safety deputies’ suggestions are taken seriously by the management 
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Appendix B 
Psychological Capital Questionnaire (PCQ) 
Below are statements that describe how you may think about yourself right now. Use 
the following scales to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement. 
Mark each statement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 6 = strongly agree. (* reversed). 
 
Self -efficacy 
1. I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a solution.  
2. I feel confident in representing my work area in meetings with management.  
3. I feel confident contributing to discussions about the company’s strategy.  
4. I feel confident helping to set targets/goals in my work area.  
5. I feel confident contacting people outside the company (e.g., suppliers, customers) 
to discuss problems.  
6. I feel confident presenting information to a group of colleagues.  
Hope 
7. If I should find myself in a jam at work, I could think of many ways to get out of 
it.  
8. At the present time, I am energetically pursuing my work goals.  
9. There are lots of ways around any problem.  
10. Right now I see myself as being pretty successful at work.  
11. I can think of many ways to reach my current work goals.  
12. At this time, I am meeting the work goals that I have set for myself.  
Resilience 
13. When I have a setback at work, I have trouble recovering from it, moving on* 
14. I usually manage difficulties one way or another at work.  
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15. I can be “on my own,” so to speak, at work if I have to.  
16. I usually take stressful things at work in stride.  
17. I can get through difficult times at work because I’ve experienced difficulty 
before.  
18. I feel I can handle many things at a time at this job.  
Optimism 
19. When things are uncertain for me at work, I usually expect the best.  
20. If something can go wrong for me work-wise, it will. * 
21. I always look on the bright side of things regarding my job.  
22. I’m optimistic about what will happen to me in the future as it pertains to work.  
23. In this job, things never work out the way I want them to. * 
24. I approach this job as if “every cloud has a silver lining.”  
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Appendix C 
The Job Satisfaction Questionnaire  
Based on your current work situation, indicate to what degree you agree with the 
various statements. Mark each statement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly 
agree. (* reversed). 
1. I feel fairly satisfied with my present job  
2. Most days I am enthusiastic about my work  
3. I find real enjoyment in my work  
4. I consider my job rather unpleasant * 
5. Each day of work seems like it will never end * 
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Appendix D 
Situation Awareness Questionnaire 
The following statements are related to the safety situation on board. Mark each 
statement on a scale from 1 = completely disagree, to 5 = completely agree. (* reversed) 
1. I notice when an unsafe situation is about to arise at my workplace (level 3)  
2. I sometimes lose track of information relevant for maintaining safety in my work 
(level 1) * 
3. It’s hard to know what consequences my actions have for safety (level 2) * 
4. I sometimes lose track of safety due to receiving too much information at the same 
time (level 1) * 
5. I plan ahead in order to handle various adverse incidents that may arise (level 3) 
6. I know which information is relevant for safety and which information is not 
relevant for safety (Level 2) 
7. It is impossible to predict what will happen during an adverse incident (Level 3) * 
8. I know how to act to maintain safety (Level 2) 
9. I feel confident that I know how to deal with the various adverse incidents that 
may arise (Level 2) 
10. Some of the information I need to assess safety is presented in a way that makes it 
difficult to understand (Level 1) * 
11. I usually know what’s going to happen next with regards to safety (Level 3) 
12. The information I need to assess safety is easily available (Level 1) 
13. I know which situations in my work involves higher risk than others (Level 2) 
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Appendix E 
Risk Perception Scenario Questionnaire 
• How would you rate the likelihood that you over the next 12 months will be affected 
by a work and personal accidents involving..  
• How would you rate the likelihood that someone else over the next 12 months will be 
affected by a work and personal accidents involving.. 
(Mark each statement on a scale from 1 = very unlikely, to 6 = very likely) 
a) Struck by objects in motion (e. g. cargo)  
b) Trapped, crushed or squeezed  
c) Cuts or contact with sharp or pointed elements  
d) Contact with hazardous substances  
e) Man overboard 
f) Slips, trips, falls  
g) Electrical hazard, fire, explosion 
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Appendix F 
Risk Behavior Questionnaire 
The following statements are related to the safety situation on board. Mark each 
statement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree. (* reversed). 
 
1. I have exposed myself or others to danger in order to get the job done  
2. To get the job done, I have taken shortcuts with regards to safety  
3. I sometimes adapt my work to avoid triggering certain safety procedures  
4. I'm sometimes pressured to do work tasks that I know may reduce safety  
5. Being busy at port makes it difficult for me to maintain safety 
6. We are able to maintain safety while running parallel operations *  
7. I urge colleagues to stop work that I believe is being carried out in a risky way *  
8. I stop work if I think it may be dangerous for me or others to continue *  
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Appendix G 
Desirability Bias Questionnaire 
Please answer the following statements on how this relates to you. Mark each statement on a 
scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 8 = strongly agree. (* reversed). 
Self-deceptive enhancement 
1. Not always honest * 
2. Know why I like things 
3. Hard to shut off a disturbing thought * 
4. Never regret decisions 
5. Can’t make up my mind * 
6. Am completely rational 
7. Confident in judgements 
8. Doubted my ability as a lover * 
Impression management 
9. Sometimes tell lies * 
10. Never cover up mistakes 
11. Taken advantage of someone * 
12. Sometimes try to get even * 
13. Said something bad about a friend * 
14. Avoid listening 
15. Never take things (steal)  
16. Don’t gossip  
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Appendix H 
Reporting Attitudes  
Answer the following statements on how this relates to you and your work.  
Mark each statement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree. (* reversed). 
 
1. I report all minor accidents in writing 
2. There is no point in reporting unwanted events since it does not lead to 
improvements* 
3. Since it's impossible to prevent all unwanted events, we shouldn't spend too much 
resources on reporting*  
4. Reporting can have negative consequences for me * 
5. Incident investigations are used to find out who is to blame for the incident 
6. Reporting of near misses does not lead to improvements* 
7. I am not motivated to report near-misses * 
8. It would take too much time if we were to report all the near misses * 
9. Reporting all near-misses will not be helpful to increase safety * 
10. I report all incidents that may have evolved into accidents 
11. I report situations that may feel unsafe, even when I cannot point to any specific 
breaches of the safety regulation 
12. I am committed to reporting situations where security can be improved, rather than 
to report all deviations 
13. I report trivial matters that have no impact on safety, just because I’m expected to 
report a given number of incidents 
14. Reports from accidents or dangerous situations are often 'embellished' * 
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Appendix I 
Information Letter to participants 
Invitation to participate in a study about factors that influence safety among 
employees in offshore vessels. The present study is a part of a master’s thesis project in 
collaboration with the shipping company, in which we ask all employees working on offshore 
vessels in the shipping company to participate. Based on an agreement with the Department 
of Psychosocial Science at the University of Bergen, NSD – The Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data AS has assessed that the processing of personal data in this project is in 
accordance with data protection legislation.  
All information will be treated confidentially. The technical implementation of the 
survey is conducted by SurveyXact. The researcher will be given data from SurveyXact, 
which is not linked to email or IP addresses. All information will be made anonymous when 
the project is completed, by May 2020. All personal information will be deleted upon the 
completion of the project, however, the research group may use non-identifiable data for 
future research. Participation in the survey is voluntary and you may withdraw from the 
study at any point with no justification needed. However, your response would be essential to 
our project and would be much valued. 
Collected data will be stored on a password-protected computer to be safely secured. 
The information from individual participants will not be made available to the shipping 
company. However, the completed project will be presented to the management of the 
shipping company, but please note that identifying information will not be included in these 
documents or presentations.  
Your rights: Upon registering for this study, you will be asked to create your own 
unique identity marker which works as an equivalent to a username. You have the right to 
gain access, edit, delete, and receive a copy of your responses at any time after the completion 
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of the study. This will be made possible by contacting one of the project leaders and 
identifying yourself with your personal marker. This procedure will ensure your anonymity. 
We kindly ask that you remember the marker as well as keeping it secret for your own 
privacy’s sake. You also have the right to file a complaint to the Norwegian Data Protection 
Authority regarding the processing of your personal data.  
You will be asked to answer an online questionnaire that should take approximately 
20-30 minutes to complete. If you choose to participate in the study, you will be asked to 
determine to which degree you agree to a series of questions regarding safety-related matters 
at work as well as yourself. Your consent allows us to analyze your personal data. 
 
Thank you for your participation! By giving my consent, I have received the 
information about the study “safety on offshore vessels” and I understand the implications of 
participating. I have had opportunity to ask questions about the study. And I am 18 years or 
older.  
I give consent to participate in this online survey and the processing of my data: ________ 
Date: ___/____/____ 
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Appendix J 
Debriefing Page  
We thank you for taking the time to participate in our study. Your time and effort 
mean a great deal to our project.  
Title: Exploring the Contribution of Individual Factors for Accident Prevention in 
Offshore Vessels. The purpose of this study is to identify some cognitive, affective, and 
personality factors that contribute to safer offshore operations. Our study aims to provide a 
proactive toolbox to determine which individual factors might predict safety outcomes. For 
instance, we believe that having a positive outlook on the future, as well as confidence in 
one’s own ability to reach goals would affect the work environment in such a way that 
offshore operations occur in a safer manner.  
It is important to us that our hypothesis do not get revealed to other participants before 
they respond to the survey. This is because having knowledge about our research question 
may affect the way in which participants frame their answers. Therefore, we kindly ask that 
you do not share information about specific content or our hypotheses to your colleagues.  
We will determine whether our hypotheses are supported or not by connecting your responses 
to accident data from the shipping company’s entire fleet. Your anonymity will be prioritized 
throughout our data analysis.   
You have the right to gain access, edit, delete, and receive a copy of your responses up 
until the start of data analysis (The end of January 2020). This will be made possible by 
contacting one of the project leaders and identifying yourself with your personal marker.  
We will be happy to share our finished master thesis with anyone who participated in the 
study. You may contact us via email or you can contact the shipping company’s management.  
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Appendix K  
Pre-Registration Edits 
Status update of the project “Exploring the Contribution of Individual Factors for 
Accident Prevention in Offshore Vessels”. Date of document: February 17th, 2020 
Since the completion of the preregistration of the current project, we have encountered 
several challenges that have changed the trajectory of our study. The rationale behind this 
document is to lay out these challenges and openly discuss their implications. Importantly, the 
data has not yet been previewed or analyzed to any extent by the researchers. 
Firstly, the number of participants is far lower than what was initially expected. The 
goal was to reach approximately 400 participants, which would be a response rate of about 40 
percent. Going towards the end of the data collection period, our current response rate is 
approximately 28 percent.  
Furthermore, a few days before the survey was ready to be dispatched, the shipping 
company informed of a survey that was ongoing among the crew. The survey was executed 
by an external firm, and unfortunately it also incorporated some of the same subjects as 
covered by our survey. The theme of their survey was trust-based leadership and it focused on 
positive aspects of the workplace. We postponed the start date of our survey with two weeks 
and sent out the email a link to our survey at December 2nd, 2019 (and a stop date at February 
14th, 2020). We suspect that this may have affected the willingness of the crew to participate 
in a second survey, and it may unfortunately affect the responses of those who did participate 
in or survey after the other.  
The postponement as well as the low rate of new participants to our survey has 
resulted in a more rigid time pressure than we first assumed would be realistic. Our plan was 
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to register key performance indicators (an objective number of accidents and near misses) 
after the survey was closed so we could infer some causality. However, due to the present 
time pressure we are unable to do so within the time the project is due to be finished. In other 
words, we will no longer be able to collect and analyze objective data, and we therefore lose 
one of our variables. Due to the elimination of this variable, we can no longer test our 
hypothesis number four. 
In the period after the pre-registration was completed, we carried out a more rigorous 
literature review of our research topic, and quickly realized that hypothesis number one, in 
which we hypothesized that psychological capital, safety climate, job satisfaction, and 
hardiness are positively related to situation awareness. We assume that they all do, but we 
have however realized that there is a possibility of multicollinearity within our variables in 
our first hypothesis. Psychological capital and hardiness will most likely correlate in their 
resilience elements, as well as the correlation between job satisfaction and safety climate. To 
adjust for these deficiencies, we have decided to remove hardiness from our analyses, and to 
complete the multiple regression as it is, with the possibility that safety climate and job 
satisfaction correlate.  
The next phase in our project will be to start the data analysis.  
 
 
 
 
